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Introduction
First amendment principles protect both freedom of speech and of
religion.' The First Amendment also limits governmental involvement
in or sponsorship of religious activities.' The controversy in recent years
over the presence of student religious clubs in the public schools,3 height-
ened by the Supreme Court's decision in Widmar v. Vincent,4 raises the
issue of whether these two first amendment rights compete, and if so,
how they are to be reconciled. This Article analyzes equal access pro-
grams, which would allow student-initiated religious activities the same
rights in the public high school allowed to other student groups.' The
1. The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make
no law .. abridging the freedom of speech .. " U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses protecting religious freedom provide "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ...." U.S.
CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment has been held applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (Establishment
Clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (Free Exercise Clause); Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (Free Exercise Clause).
2. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 15.
3. See infra note 38.
4. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). Widmar concerned the extent to which students in public uni-
versities may voluntarily gather for devotional exercises. The Court held that when a state
university creates a forum on the university campus open for use by student groups, the uni-
versity's exclusion of religious student groups is a "content-based exclusion of religious
speech" in violation of "the fundamental principle that a state regulation of speech should be
content-neutral .... Id. at 277. In so holding, the Court declared "[i]t does not follow...
that an 'equal access' policy would be incompatible with this Court's Establishment Clause
cases." Id. at 271.
5. The "equal access" theory, that all student-initiated activities in the public schools-
religious or nonreligious-must be treated equally, was articulated by the Supreme Court in
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
The equal access principles applied in Widmar derive from public forum doctrine. This
doctrine, premised on both First Amendment free speech, see Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345
U.S. 67 (1953), and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection principles, see, e.g., Carey v.
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EQUAL ACCESS POLICIES 5
Article proposes that equal access programs in the public secondary
schools raise significant establishment clause problems with no counter-
vailing compelling first amendment free speech mandate.
The equal access approach to prayer and other religious activities in
the public schools recently gained the approval of Congress with the en-
actment of the Equal Access Act.' The constitutionality of this Act may
be implicated in Bender v. Williamsport Area School District,7 a pre-Act
case currently before the United States Supreme Court, which involves a
Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980), essentially provides that in a public forum there may be no con-
tent discrimination of speech. See generally Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972) (cited in Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 n.5). The public forum principle was extended to the
public university in Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972).
In Widmar, a public university that had opened its facilities to over one hundred different
student groups was held to constitute an open forum, where all groups, religious and nonreli-
gious, must be treated equally. 454 U.S. at 268. This open forum character of the facility,
together with the absence of school sponsorship, raised no countervailing establishment
problems which might have called for special treatment of the religious student group. Id. at
271. See generally Note, The Rights of Student Religious Groups Under the First Amendment
to Hold Religious Meetings on the Public University Campus, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 1008, 1050-
51 (1981).
The logic of the Widmar holding, limited by the Court only to those public universities
providing a public forum, was extended to a public high school in Bender v. Williamsport Area
School Dist., 563 F. Supp. 697 (M.D. Pa. 1983), but this decision was reversed by the Third
Circuit, 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984). Cf Bell v. Little Axe Indep. School Dist., 766 F.2d 1391
(10th Cir. 1985); Nartowicz v. Clayton County School Dist., 736 F.2d 646 (11th Cir. 1984);
Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981) discussed infra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
Proponents of equal access legislation in the U.S. Congress, seeking to extend the Widmar
decision to those high schools receiving federal funding, have expressed an "equality" thesis
similar to that applied by the district court in Bender. See EqualAccess-A First Amendment
Question: Hearings on S. 815 and S. 1059 Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 5 (1983) (prepared statement of Sen. Mark Hatfield) [hereinafter cited as Sen. Jud.
Comm. Equal Access Hearings]. "What this all attempts to do is to put voluntary religious
activity on an equal footing with other extracurricular activities that are permitted on school
premises." Id. at 26 (statement of Hon. Terrel Bell, Secretary of Education). See also Amicus
Brief of Senator Hatfield and Twenty-Three Other U.S. Senators, Lubbock Civil Liberties
Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982) reprinted in Sen. Jud.
Comm. Equal Access Hearings at 6 (stating that failure to extend Widmar to the high schools
violated the "principle of neutrality" toward religion and violated the free speech rights of
students).
6. Pub. L. No. 98-377, 98 Stat. 1302 (1984) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-73). The
Equal Access Act was enacted to allow student religious groups to operate on public secondary
school premises to the same extent as other noncurricular student activites. See infra note 30.
7. 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 518 (1985) (upholding school
decision to deny equal access to student religious group on basis that student free speech rights
were overridden by establishment concerns). The Bender decision discusses the equal access
congressional hearings process concerning the Religious Speech Protection Act, predecessor to
the Equal Access Act, as evidence of the complex first amendment interests triggered by equal
access. 741 F.2d at 554 n.23.
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high school prayer club meeting during the school day.8 The Supreme
Court will address whether permission for such club meetings is required
under first and fourteenth amendment free speech,9 equal protection,"°
and free exercise of religion principles,"' or is prohibited under the First
8. Id. at 542. The student proposal provided that "[tihe organization will be a nonde-
nominational prayer fellowship.... Regular meetings ... will be held on school premises
during the Tuesday and Thursday morning activity periods." Id.
9. The free speech right to equal access has been enunciated in many cases. As applied
to the public universities, it was accepted by the Supreme Court in Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263 (1981). In contrast, in every case barring one that has considered the issue in the
public high school context, it has been rejected. Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1048; Brandon, 635
F.2d at 980-81; Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999, 1002 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 957
(1965); Mary May v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp., 615 F. Supp. 761 (S.D. Ind. 1985)
(denial of access to school property held not to be a violation of teachers' free speech rights);
Hunt v. Board of Educ., 321 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (S.D. W. Va. 1971); Trietley v. Board of
Educ., 65 A.D.2d 1, 8, 409 N.Y.S.2d 912, 916 (1978). See also Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (First Amendment not violated when elected
union granted access to interschool mail system while access denied to rival union); Student
Coalition For Peace v. Lower Merion School, 776 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1985) (no first amendment
right of access to school athletic field). But see Bender v. Williamsport, 563 F. Supp. 697
(M.D. Pa. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984) (establishment concern
considered more compelling than free speech right), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 518 (1985). But
cf Clergy and Laity Concerned v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 586 F. Supp. 1408 (N.D. Ill. 1984)
(First Amendment violated when board of education allowed military recruiters access to its
schools while denying same privilege to activists).
The chief argument for proponents of congressional equal access legislation centers on
free speech and the tradition of free exchange of ideas, which it is argued, requires equal treat-
ment of religious and nonreligious speech in public high schools under the constitutional prin-
ciple of "content neutrality." Sen. Jud. Comm. Equal Access Hearings, supra note 5, at 8
(prepared statement of Sen. Hatfield).
10. See supra note 5. The only cases finding an equal protection right to religious clubs
concern a university setting. E.g., Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp. 963 (N.D. Miss. 1969). In
Widmar, the Court relied upon public forum cases providing for Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tection against content discrimination. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461, 464-65 (1980)
(relied on in Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270); Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (relied on in
Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 n.5). See also Toms & Whitehead, The Religious Student in Public
Education: Resolving a Constitutional Dilemma, 27 EMORY L.J. 3, 42 (1978).
To the extent equal protection principles prohibit distinction between the religious and
nonreligious, see, e.g., Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277; Bender, 741 F.2d at 569 (Adams, J., dissent-
ing), as opposed to drawing distinctions among religions, see, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S.
228 (1982), these principles would appear to conflict with the establishment mandate. But see
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 7 (1947).
11. Although the Bender case itself does not consider a free exercise right to equal access,
this claim has been addressed by courts in the context of religious expression rights, and was
raised by the Equal Access Act. Summary judgment had been granted below against the
Bender plaintiffs' free exercise claims. 563 F. Supp. at 703. This ruling was not disturbed by
the Third Circuit which held that appellants' free speech right to gather in order to pray in
school clubs was outweighed by establishment concerns. 741 F.2d at 560.
Accordingly, free exercise and free speech concerns have been treated interchangeably by
the Supreme Court when public forums were at issue, depending on the form of religious
expression. Compare Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (worship as religious speech);
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) (Bible talks treated as exercise of freedom of
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Amendment's separation of church and state. 12
The premise of this Article is that the Equal Access Act is unconsti-
tutional under the First Amendment Establishment Clause. The legisla-
tive history shows its purpose was to bring organized prayer, barred by
the Supreme Court in the 1960's,13 back into the public schools. 4 In
addition, the extent of school sponsorship contemplated by the Act is
unconstitutional. 15
Bender is not the first time the Court will have considered the role of
organized religion in the public schools. The Court has consistently pro-
hibited religious activities organized under presumptive government
sponsorship as follows: on public school premises, during the school
speech); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951) (religious meetings on city streets protected
as exercise of freedom of speech); and Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (use of sound
amplification devices in public places for religious purposes protected as free speech) with Hef-
fron v. International Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (solicitation in fair-
grounds treated as free exercise) and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (solicitation
as free exercise).
The free exercise claim to equal access religious meetings was raised in Widmar and many
other cases. The Supreme Court did not reach it in Widmar, 454 U.S. at 273 n. 13. In almost
every other case considering the issue the argument has been rejected. Bender, 741 F.2d at
560; Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038, 1048
(1982); Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897, 902 (1981); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d at
977; Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999, 1001 (2d Cir. 1965); Hunt v. Board of Educ., 321 F.
Supp. at 1266-67; Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1,
16-17, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43, 52-53 (1977); Trietley v. Board of Educ., 65 A.D.2d 1, 8, 409
N.Y.S.2d 912, 916-17 (1978). But see Dittman v. Western Wash. Univ., No. 79-1189, slip op.
(W.D. Wash. Feb. 28, 1980) (finding free exercise right to prayer meetings in public university
but held overridden by establishment interest), vacated and remanded in light of Widmar, No.
80-3120 (9th Cir. Mar. 30, 1982); Keegan v. University of Del., 349 A.2d 14 (Del. 1975)
(upholding free exercise right to religious clubs in public university), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934
(1976).
In the congressional equal access debate, the free exercise claim to equal access repre-
sented a minority view advocated in the testimony of Professor Laurence Tribe. Religious
Speech Protection Act. Hearing on H.R. 4996 Before the Subcomm. on Elementary, Secondary
and Vocational Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
45 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Religious Speech Protection Act Hearings]. For full discussion of
the free exercise argument, see infra text accompanying notes 333-55.
12. See, e.g., infra note 38.
13. See, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962).
14. Although the Act strives to mask its religious purpose by providing protection against
discrimination for all student clubs, the Act's provisions limiting school sponsorship of clubs-
required by the Constitution only for religious clubs-together with legislative history of the
Act and its predecessor bills, reveal its true religious purpose. See infra notes 125-41 and
accompanying text. As stated by its sponsors, the intent of equal access legislation was to
"clear up the mistakes of the two circuits and school districts (Brandon and Lubbock) which
have followed Widmar." Memorandum to Senate Staff from March Bell and Karl Moor, Sub-
comm. on Security and Terrorism at 1 (Jan. 14, 1983).
15. See infra notes 165-224 and accompanying text.
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day, under faculty supervision, and with attendance required by state
law.16 This Article argues that even the presence of numerous different
religious groups in a public school-the "best case scenario," according
to equal access proponents-involves the government in the advance-
ment of religion and entangles the state in affairs best left to religious
authorities. 17
Proponents of equal access argue that all student activities should be
treated alike.18 They further claim that because these religious activities
are initiated by students rather than the state, they are not barred by the
Establishment Clause.19 This Article argues that equal access religious
16. See, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (disallowing
teacher-led morning Bible readings); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (striking New York
state law providing for morning prayer); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948)
(disallowing multi-denominational religious instruction classes conducted by private religious
instructors on school premises).
17. See, e.g., Abington, 374 U.S. at 216; McCollum, 333 U.S. at 210-11; Everson, 330 U.S.
at 15-16.
18. The "equality argument" maintains that it is not a violation of the Establishment
Clause to provide a benefit to religion that is provided to all. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463
U.S. 388 (1983); Widmar, 454 U.S. 263; Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). See also
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Clark, Comments on Some Policies Underlying
the Constitutional Law of Religious Freedom, 64 MINN. L. REV. 453, 456-57 (1980). This
argument was used in Widmar, but there the only benefit accorded was the use of public forum
premises. Similarly, Mueller and Walz, concerning parochial aid and tax exemptions, respec-
tively, involved an arguably low level of indirect government advancement of religion as com-
pared to the greater level of sponsorship involved when religious activities are organized in the
public schools.
19. The materiality of the "student-initiation" factor was the central argument in the peti-
tion for certiorari in Lubbock, filed after the Supreme Court decision in Widmar. The petition
was filed in an amicus brief written by twenty-four Senators seeking reversal of the Fifth Cir-
cuit's decision disallowing an equal access policy providing for student prayer clubs before and
after school. "Amici believe that neither legislation nor a constitutional amendment is re-
quired to permit a school to open its facilities for all appropriate student-initiated and student-
managed activities including, if the students wish, religious activities." Amicus Brief of Sena-
tor Hatfield and Twenty-Three Other U.S. Senators at 2, Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v.
Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982), reprinted in Sen. Jud. Comm.
Equal Access Hearings, supra note 5, at 22.
The argument that the Supreme Court should extend the Widmar decision to "student-
initiated" high school student prayer clubs was popular in the literature written subsequent to
Widmar, which propounded that the decision was based upon the materiality of the student-
initiation factor in the establishment clause analysis. See Drakeman & Seawright, God and
Kids at School Voluntary Religious Activities in the Public Schools, 14 SETON HALL 252
(1984); Loewy, School Prayer, Neutrality, and the Open Forum: Why We Don't Need a Consti-
tutionalAmendment, 61 N.C.L. REV. 141 (1982); Toms & Whitehead, Religious Expression in
the Public School Forum: The High School Student's Right to Free Speech, 72 GEO. L.J. 135,
155 (1983); Note, The Constitutionality of Student-Initiated Religious Meetings on Public
School Grounds, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 740-85 (1981); Note, The Constitutional Dimensions of
Student-Initiated Religious Activity in Public High Schools, 92 YALE L.J. 499, 502 (1983);
Comment, Widmar v. Vincent and The Public Forum Doctrine: Time to Reconsider Public
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activities are prohibited whether student-initiated or not because a pre-
sumption of state sponsorship arises whenever religious activities are or-
ganized on public school premises at times associated with the school
day. This state support for religious activities organized in the public
schools threatens the essence of the establishment bar.20 Government aid
to religion, the Framers believed, erodes that equality among religions
necessary for meaningful free exercise of religion.2 1 The Framers main-
tained even if initiated on a multi-denominational basis such aid quickly
converts to sectarian benefit.22 Avoidance of strife among religions for
government support yields the principle that government may not assist
religions to gather their adherents. 23 Nowhere is this principle more im-
portant and nowhere has it been more severely threatened than in the
School Prayer, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 147. But see Note, State University Regulation Prohibiting
Use of Facilities for Student Religious Worship or Teaching Violates Free Speech Rights, 66
MARQ. L. REV. 178 (1982).
This post- Widmar initiation theory emerged as a central feature in the development of the
"equal access" concept in hearings for the Equal Access Act. As declared by Sen. Hatfield, the
principal sponsor of the Equal Access Act, establishment problems due to religion in the pub-
lic schools relate only to: "state-initiated prayers, or Bible readings or the inculcation of reli-
gious belief by the state and not to the state's neutral accommodation of religious meetings."
Sen. Jud Comm. Equal Access Hearings, supra note 5, at 7 (prepared statement of Sen.
Hatfield).
20. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) ("Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another.... No tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or
whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.") (cited in McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210 (1948)) (striking multi-denominational religious instruction on public
school premises).
21. J. Madison, 4 Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, para. 11
(1784), reprinted in W. HUTCHINSON, R. RUTLAND, & W. RACHAL, PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 295-306 (1962) ("Because it will destroy that moderation and harmony which the
forbearance of our laws to intermeddle with Religion has produced among its several sects.").
See Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216, 3222 (1985) ("Religion ... can serve
also powerfully to divide societies. . ."); Wallace v. Jaifree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2489 (1985).
22. J. Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, II WRIT-
INGS OF MADISON 183, at 185-86 (cited in Engel, 370 U.S. at 436: "[I]t is proper to take alarm
at the first experiment on our liberties.... Who does not see that the same authority which
can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the same ease
any particular Sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects?"). See also Abington, 374 U.S.
at 222 (striking teacher-led Bible reading):
The wholesome "neutrality" of which this Court's cases speak thus stems from a
recognition of the teachings of history that powerful sects or groups might bring
about a fusion of governmental and religious functions or a concert or dependency of
one upon the other to the end that official support of the State or Federal Govern-
ment would be placed behind the tenets of one or of all orthodoxies.
23. See, eg., Abington, 374 U.S. at 229 (Douglas, J., concurring). See also Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding tuition tax deductions) ("what is at stake ... is prevent-
ing that kind and degree of government involvement in religious life that, as history teaches us,
is apt to lead to strife").
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public schools.24 The Court has consistently held religious strife in the
public schools threatens their uniquely "public function," 2 -to serve as
a training ground for "the habits of community' ' 26 free of "parochial,
divisive or separatist influences."
27
Prevailing first amendment theory does not reasonably account for
the varying establishment problems and free speech, free exercise, and
equal protection rights raised by equal access in different government
forums.28 This Article proposes that the first amendment free speech and
free exercise rights to religious expression, which are the predicates of
equal access theory, are limited by many of the same factors posing the
establishment concern: the particular purpose of the public property and
the presumption of government function, control, and involvement.
These factors will be discussed through a unitary factual inquiry that
analyzes the nature of a government forum, which in turn defines the
various first amendment concerns raised by equal access. This analysis
produces a coherent first amendment theory, which in almost all cases
obviates weighing conflicting interests. If the factual inquiry presents
conflicting first amendment concerns, these are reconciled through the
consideration of available alternative forums for religious expression.
The Article concludes that in the absence of other overriding constitu-
tional interests, the First Amendment Establishment Clause bars organ-
ized, student-initiated religious activities on public school premises,
during times associated with the school day.
24. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2489 (1985); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S.
39 (1980); Epperson v. Arkansas, 390 U.S. 941 (1968); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947). See also McCollum, 333 U.S. at 216-17 ("Designed to serve as perhaps the most pow-
erful agency for promoting cohesion among heterogeneous democratic people, the public
school must keep scrupulously free from entanglement in the strife of sects. The preservation
of the community from divisive conflicts, of Government from irreconcilable pressures by reli-
gious groups, of religion from censorship and coercion however subtly exercised, requires strict
confinement of the State to instruction other than religious ... ").
25. Abington, 374 U.S. at 241-42 (Brennan, J., concurring).
26. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 227.
27. Abington, 374 U.S. at 242 (Brennan, J., concurring). See Grand Rapids School Dist.
v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216, 3222 (1985) (emphasizing importance of "case[s] involving the sensi-
tive relationship between government and religion in the education of our children"); see also
Aguilar v. Felton; 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985).
28. See, e.g., Bender, 741 F.2d at 559. See also Note, Religious Expression in the Public
School Forum: The High School Student's Right to Free Speech, 72 GEO. L. J. 135 (1983)
(proposing extension of Widmar to the high schools and positing independent free speech right
to equal access to public schools which may be limited only to serve a compelling state
interest).
EQUAL ACCESS POLICIES
I. The History of Equal Access
The term "equal access" describes school policies that treat all ex-
tra-curricular school clubs-religious and nonreligious--equally. These
policies allow voluntary, student-initiated religious groups access, during
noncurricular hours, to school facilities on the same terms as provided to
nonreligious groups.2 9 The newly enacted federal Equal Access Act30 is
29. An example of an equal access policy adopted by a school board is that adopted by the
Lubbock School Board in the Lubbock Independent School District. That policy, adopted in
August 1980, provided in pertinent part:
The school board permits students to gather at the school with supervision either
before or after regular [school] hours on the same basis as other groups as determined
by the school administration to meet for any educational, moral, religious or ethical
purposes so long as attendance at such meetings is voluntary.
L.I.S.D. policy at para. 4 (cited in Lubbock 669 F.2d at 1041).
30. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071, 4072 (Supp. 1985) provide in part:
SUBCHAPTER VIII-EQUAL ACCESS
This title may be cited as "The Equal Access Act".
DENIAL OF EQUAL ACCESS PROHIBITED
(a) It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives Federal
financial assistance and which has a limited open forum to deny equal access or a fair
opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students who wish to conduct a meeting
within that limited open forum on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical,
or other content of the speech at such meetings.
(b) A public secondary school has a limited open forum whenever such school
grants an offering to or opportunity for one or more noncurriculum related student
groups to meet on school premises during noninstructional time.
(c) Schools shall be deemed to offer a fair opportunity to students who wish to
conduct a meeting within its limited open forum if such school uniformly provides
that - (1) the meeting is voluntary and student-initiated;
(2) there is no sponsorship of the meeting by the school, the government,
or its agents or employees;
(3) employees or agents of the school or government are present at reli-
gious meetings only in a nonparticipatory capacity;
(4) the meeting does not materially and substantially interfere with the or-
derly conduct of educational activities within the school; and
(5) nonschool persons may not direct, conduct, control, or regularly attend
activities of student groups.
(d) Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize the United States
or any State or political subdivision thereof -
(1) to influence the form or content of any prayer or other religious activ-ity;
(2) to require any person to participate in prayer or other religious activity;
(3) to expend public funds beyond the incidental cost of providing the
space for student-initiated meetings;
(4) to compel any school agent or employee to attend a school meeting if
the content of the speech at the meeting is contrary to the beliefs of the agent or
employee;
(5) to sanction meetings that are otherwise unlawful;
(6) to limit the rights of groups of students which are not of a specified
numerical size; or
(7) to abridge the constitutional rights of any person.
(e) Notwithstanding the availability of any other remedy under the Constitution
or the laws of the United States, nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to
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an example. It provides uniform guidelines regarding equal access:
when a public school allows "one or more noncurriculum related student
groups to meet on school premises during noninstructional time,"31 the
school may not "discriminate against any students who wish to conduct
a meeting ... on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical, or
other contents of the speech at such meetings."'32
The development of the equal access concept in cases considering
religious activities in public schools has given rise to four different forms
of equal access policies. Some equal access policies are adopted by school
boards prior to any request for use by student-initiated religious
groups.33 In other instances, permissive equal access policies follow the
requests of student-initiated religious groups.34 Yet a third example is de
facto equal access, in which the school allows student religious groups
access to school classrooms, but the policy is not a written part of the
authorize the United States to deny or withhold Federal financial assistance to any
school.
(f) Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to limit the authority of the
school, its agent or employees, to maintain order and discipline on school premises,
to protect the well-being of students and faculty, and to assure that attendance of
students at meetings is voluntary.
DEFINITIONS
Sec. 4072. As used in this subchapter -
(1) The term "secondary school" means a public school which provides
secondary education as determined by State law.
(2) The term "sponsorship" includes the act of promoting, leading, or par-
ticipating in a meeting. The assignment of a teacher, administrator, or other
school employee to a meeting for custodial purposes does not constitute spon-
sorship of the meeting.
(3) The term "meeting" includes those activities of student groups which
are permitted under a school's limited open forum and are not directly related to
the school curriculum.
(4) The term "noninstructional time" means time set aside by the school
before actual classroom instruction begins or after actual classroom instruction
ends.
31. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(b).
32. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a).
33. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). In Widmar, the University of
Missouri had adopted a policy "to encourage the activites of student organizations," id. at 265,
and in furtherance of this policy had permitted activities by more than 100 different student
groups. Pursuant to this established policy, a student group made a request to use the univer-
sity's facilities. See also Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 563 F. Supp. 697 (M.D. Pa.
1983) (upholding student-initiated high school prayer clubs during school noninstructional
time where high school had preexisting open forum policy), rev'd, 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984),
cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 518 (1985); Nartowicz v. Clayton County School Dist., 736 F.2d 646
(lth Cir. 1984) (disallowing after hour student-initiated prayer clubs in light of other in-
stances of school support of religious activities, where a high school had preexisting open
forum policy).
34. E.g., Little Axe, 766 F.2d at 1396-97; Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1039.
EQUAL ACCESS POLICIES
school's regulations.35 In the fourth group are schools which deny access
to students who voluntarily seek to organize for prayer on school prem-
ises.36 This group of schools could be considered to have adopted poli-
cies of de facto no equal access.
Equal access policies, primarily in the form of de facto no equal
access, have been the subject of case law ever since the Supreme Court's
1960's decisions barring state sponsored prayer and Bible reading in the
schools.37 The overwhelming majority of these cases upheld school
board denials of access and held student-initiated religious activities in
public secondary schools to violate the First Amendment Establishment
Clause. No countervailing free speech or free exercise mandates were
found.38
35. E.g., Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Mich. 1965) (forbidding a school
board policy permitting elementary school students to pray in period before class began and
after classes ended, in a classroom other than the homeroom).
36. E.g., Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980).
37. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962).
38. Many federal and state court decisions have found equal access to be unconstitutional
and have either struck down equal access policies or upheld the denial of equal access. Bell v.
Little Axe Indep. School Dist., 766 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1985) (striking as unconstitutional
school supported equal access prayer-club policy permitting meetings before commencement
of elementary and junior high school classes); Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741
F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984) (upholding a school decision denying right to voluntary prayer meet-
ing during activity period within the school day), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 518 (1985);
Nartowicz v. Clayton County School Dist., 736 F.2d 646 (1 lth Cir. 1984) (striking, inter alia,
school district equal access policy allowing after-school student prayer group); Lubbock Civil
Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1155 (1983) (striking school district equal access policy providing for prayer group
before and after school); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1123 (198 1) (holding unconstitutional morning prayer clubs denied access by school);
Mergens v. Board of Educ. of Westside School, No. 85-0426, slip op. (D. Neb. May 23, 1985);
Trietley v. Board of Educ., 65 A.D.2d 1, 409 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1978) (holding unconstitutional a
policy permitting Bible clubs to meet before and after the school day); Johnson v. Huntington
Beach Union High School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 877 (1977) (holding unconstitutional Bible study club meeting during the school day).
See also Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1965) (upholding school board authority to
prevent group prayer on grounds that free speech and free exercise do not compel it); Hunt v.
Board of Educ., 321 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D. W. Va. 1971) (upholding school board authority to
prevent organized group prayer not on grounds that establishment bars it but rather that free
speech and free exercise do not compel it). Cf. Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1981),
aff'd, 455 U.S. 913 (1982) (striking school policy based on statute allowing voluntary teacher
or student-led prayers before school); Collins v. Chandler Unified School Dist., 644 F.2d 759
(9th Cir. 1981) (striking school policy permitting prayer at nonmandatory student assemblies);
State Bd. of Educ. v. Board of Educ. of Netcong, 108 N.J. Super. 564, 262 A.2d 21 (Ch. Div.)
(striking school program providing a period before each school day for free exercise of reli-
gion), aff'dper curiam, 57 N.J. 172, 270 A.2d 412 (1970), cert denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971).
See also Mary May v. Evansville-Vanderburgh, 615 F. Supp. 761 (S. D. Ind. 1985) (teachers
seeking equal access). But see Amidei v. Spring Branch, No. H-84-4673 (S.D. Tex. May 9,
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Support for the theory of equal access in the public schools derives
from the Supreme Court's decision in Widmar v. Vincent.39 Widmar
concerned the extent to which students in state universities may volunta-
rily gather for devotional activities. The Court held that when a state
university creates a public forum on its campus, open for use by all stu-
dent groups, the university's exclusion of student religious groups is a
"content-based exclusion of religious speech"' violating "the fundamen-
tal principle that a state regulation of speech should be content-neu-
tral."' 1  The Court found that a public university campus "possesses
many of the characteristics of a public forum,"'4 2 and as such, imposes a
burden on the university to justify with a compelling interest its content-
based exclusion of "religious speech. '4 3 The Court determined that,
given both the particular characteristics of the University of Missouri
campus as a type of public forum' and the maturity of university stu-
dents,45 no establishment was created.46 Based on this finding, the Court
expressly withheld judgment on the need to strike a balance between po-
tentially competing free speech and establishment concerns.47
By 1982, the Widmar holding allowing equal access at the piblic
university level co-existed with two federal appellate decisions forbidding
equal access in public high schools. In Brandon v. Board of Education"
and Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Independent School Dis-
trict,4 9 the Courts of Appeals for the Second and Fifth Circuits, respec-
tively, decided that student-initiated voluntary religious meetings held on
1985) (enjoining school district from barring morning high school Bible study meetings held
pursuant to the Equal Access Act); Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Mich. 1965)
(upholding school policy allowing voluntary student prayer completed five minutes prior to the
school day or beginning subsequent thereto). But cf Clergy and Laity Concerned v. Chicago
Bd. of Educ., 586 F. Supp. 1408, 1412 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (holding unconstitutional school denial
of access to anti-war activity; dictum affirming applicability of Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263 (1981) to high school).
39. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
40. Id. at 277.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 267 n.5.
43. Id. at 276-77.
44. Id. at 267 n.5.
45. Id. at 274 n. 14 ("University students are, of course, young adults. They are less im-
pressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that the University's pol-
icy is one of neutrality toward religion.").
46. Id. at 273-75.
47. Id. at 273 n.13.
48. 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981) (religious meetings
organized before classes but after buses delivered the students to school).
49. 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155-56 (1983) (student-initiated
voluntary religious meetings held on public high school premises before buses arrived and after
buses departed school).
public school premises, before or after the school day, violated the First
Amendment Establishment Clause. These decisions emphasized that
certain establishment problems are inherent in equal access to public
high school forums. The Brandon court found that for public school
students, participating in communal prayer meetings occurred in the
"captive audience setting" of the school." The court stated, "To an im-
pressionable student, even the mere appearance of secular involvement in
religious activities might indicate that the state has placed its imprimatur
on a particular religious creed."'" Similarly, the court in Lubbock found
the "policy of allowing religious meetings at a time closely associated
with the beginning or end of the school day implies recognition of reli-
gious activities and meetings as an integral part of the District's extracur-
ricular program and carries with it an implicit approval by school
officials of those programs."52 Because the Supreme Court denied certio-
rari in both of these cases, they are controlling precedent in the Second
and Fifth Circuits and have had a strong persuasive effect nationwide.
In barring student-initiated religious activities in high schools on es-
tablishment clause grounds, Brandon and Lubbock appeared to conflict
with the earlier Widmar decision, which found no establishment clause
violation on a public university campus. The Supreme Court's failure to
reconcile this conflict by granting review led some to conclude that the
Court had confined Widmar's approval of equal access to its facts-a
public university with a preexisting open forum 53 and would not extend
its reasoning to the high school setting.54
50. Brandon, 635 F.2d at 978.
51. Id.
52. Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1045.
53. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267, 274. But see Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) ("the
college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas' ")
(cited in Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 n.5). Healy suggests that Widmar need not be confined to
its particular facts (i.e., a preexisting open forum policy that made university facilities available
to over 100 clubs), because the university setting in general is an appropriate forum for equal
access.
54. Denials of certiorari generally do not indicate decisions on the merits. See generally
Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1227 (1979). However, the
denials of certiorari in Brandon and Lubbock may suggest otherwise. See Amicus Curiae Brief
of American Jewish Congress at 7, Nartowicz 736 F.2d 646 (11th Cir. 1984), noting that the
petitions for certiorari in Brandon and Lubbock were denied, and claiming that Widmar was
inconsistent. But see Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Petition for Writ of Certio-
rari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at 8, Bender v. Williamsport Area
School Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 557-60 & n.26 (3d Cir. 1984) (contending that the Lubbock certio-
rari denial was based on the facts in Lubbock and did not indicate that the Court refused to
extend Widmar to high schools).
The significance of the denials of certiorari in Lubbock and Brandon need not be dimin-
ished by the granting of certiorari in Bender. Rather than indicate thejudiciary's disagreement
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In the wake of these decisions, school boards, parents, and students
nationwide were confused over the constitutionality of student-initiated
voluntary religious activities in public high schools. After Widmar,
many schools adopted equal access policies in an effort to constitutional-
ize student religious meetings." Challenges to these policies appeared to
raise issues similar to those in Widmar. At issue was whether Widmar
could, under any set of facts, apply to the high school setting, or whether
the Brandon and Lubbock reasoning prohibited student-initiated reli-
gious activity at the high school level. Three circuits would join the
Brandon and Lubbock courts in failing to extend Widmar to the high
schools.5 6 Only one court, the district court in Bender v. Williamsport
Area School District, held that a high school extracurricular activity pe-
riod contemplated an equal access policy, thus extending Widmar's open
forum mandate to the high schools."
In late 1982, the confusion caused by Brandon and Lubbock in light
of Widmar captured the attention of members of Congress.58 Measures
guaranteeing equal access-both through constitutional amendments
and by federal statutes-were proposed to reverse the Brandon and Lub-
bock decisions and to extend Widmar to allow student-initiated religious
over equal access in the high schools, the grant in Bender may point to a split between the
courts and Congress on the issue in light of the passage of the Equal Access Act.
55. For example, after the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rendered its decision in
Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980), and one month before its affirmance by the
Supreme Court in Widmar v. Vincent, the school board in Little Axe County, Oklahoma
adopted an "equal access policy" in November 1981 that ratified the morning student-initiated
prayer meetings which had begun earlier in the school year. See Bell v. Little Axe Indep.
School Dist., 766 F.2d 1391, 1397 (10th Cir. 1985).
56. Bell v. Little Axe Indep. School Dist., 766 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1985) (striking ele-
mentary and junior high school prayer meetings held before class); Bender v. Williamsport
Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984) (striking as unconstitutional a high school
prayer club organized during the school day under teacher supervision, reasoning that the
establishment concern overrode the free speech right); Nartowicz v. Clayton County School
Dist., 736 F.2d 646 (1lth Cir. 1984) (striking, as an unconstitutional establishment, afternoon
high school prayer meetings).
57. 563 F. Supp. 697, 706 (M.D. Pa. 1983). Equal access proponents claim other federal
courts have also adopted this position but they rely only on dicta in the Little Axe and
Nartowicz decisions, which actually hold to the contrary. See Brief for Petitioners at 24-25
n.23, Bender v. Williamsport, No. 84-773.
58. Some congressmen had already fought in the equal access judicial battles: Senator
Hatfield and twenty-three other members of the Senate had taken the extraordinary measure of
filing an amici curiae brief with the Supreme Court in Lubbock, asking the Court to grant
review and to extend the holding of Widmar to the high school level. The first point of the
Senators' brief was: "There is nationwide confusion concerning proper policies for religious
activities in public schools that justifies guidance from the Supreme Court." 129 CONG. REC.
S2932 (daily ed. March 25, 1983) (statement of Sen. Hatfield).
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meetings in the public schools. 59
In September 1982, Senator Mark Hatfield sponsored the original
congressional equal access proposal.60 It tracked the facts in Brandon
and Lubbock: equal access during "non-instructional periods" only for
student-initiated religious groups in secondary schools when preexisting
policies allowed other extracurricular activities. "Non-instructional peri-
ods" was not defined in the bill. This initial statutory proposal was fol-
lowed by two proposed constitutional amendments: one authorizing
silent prayer together with equal access; the other permitting vocal
59. Proponents of equal access legislation have made clear their intentions to extend the
scope of the Widmar decision to high schools. In congressional equal access hearings, Senator
Hatfield stated: "The bill is a straightforward measure to apply the Supreme Court's decision
in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), to public high schools which receive federal aid."
Sen. Jud. Comm. Equal Access Hearings, supra note 5, at 5 (prepared statement of Sen.
Hatfield). Similarly, the Reagan Administration's testimony in support of the Denton Equal
Access Bill stated: "The concept that we are considering today... would simply insure that
the public schools of this Nation abide by the constitutional principle that is articulated in the
Widmar case." Id. at 26 (Statement of Hon. Terrel Bell, Secretary of Education). This objec-
tive was also set forth by the Senators in the Lubbock amicus brief requesting that the Supreme
Court extend Widmar to Lubbock. See supra note 58.
Extending Widmar to the high schools would, according to equal access proponents, pro-
tect from constitutional challenges those religious activities in the schools which are student-
initiated: "Our public schools need to mirror the pluralism that we have in America, and by
allowing students to initiate voluntary religious activity during noninstructional periods, dur-
ing, before and after school we affirm the feature of the American character." Sen. Jud. Comm.
Equal Access Hearings, supra note 5, at 26 (statement of the Hon. Terrel Bell, Secretary of
Education). The Amicus Brief of the National Association of Evangelicals in Support of the
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
Lubbock, 669 F.2d 1038, similarly stressed "student-initiation":
The court below ignores critical distinctions between state-initiated and sponsored
religious rituals and student-initiated and run meetings before or after school which
have religious content. In so doing, it erroneously applies decisions of this Court
concerning state mandated and sponsored prayer and devotional Bible reading to
restrict First Amendment rights of public school students, recognized and protected
by this Court in Widmar v. Vincent....
Amicus Brief for Nat'l Ass'n of Evangelicals at 3, reprinted in Sen. Jud. Comm. Equal Access
Hearings, supra note 5, at 187 (emphasis in original).
In order to enforce the guarantees of the Widmar case and to extend its benefits
throughout our public school system, I have this week introduced H.R. 2732, the
Equal Access Act .... [T]he policy of giving religious as well as secular groups
equal access to school premises for extracurricular activities accords with the princi-
ples laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court [in] Widmar v. Vincent....
129 CONG. REc. S1972 (daily ed. April 28, 1983) (statement of Hon. Trent Lott in part from
the remarks of Terrel Bell).
The Congressmen also were aware of and relied upon the one favorable equal access deci-
sion in Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 563 F. Supp. 697 (M.D. Pa. 1983). See S.
REP. No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1984). They could not, however, have been aware of the
reversal of the Bender decision on July 24, 1984, in 741 F.2d 538, one day before the enactment
of the Act.
60. S. 2928 was introduced Sept. 17, 1982. S. 2928, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC.
11,719 (1982).
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prayer.6" The defeat of the silent prayer and equal access amendment has
been attributed to the voting order on the alternative prayer amend-
ments. Many Senators voted against the silent prayer and equal access
amendment first because they preferred vocal prayer. Had the vocal
prayer amendment been defeated prior to the vote on the silent prayer
and equal access amendment, it has been suggested that the latter amend-
ment would have commanded a majority sufficient to amend the
Constitution.62
Simultaneous with the proposed prayer and equal access constitu-
tional amendments, new statutory equal access legislation developed.
Several bills were introduced, sanctioning voluntary prayer clubs during
noninstructional periods in the public schools at both primary and secon-
dary school levels, without any limitations on faculty participation and
school sponsorship.63 The broad scope of these prayer club proposals
attracted strong church/state separationist opposition at the hearing and
therefore went no further than House and Senate committee considera-
tions." An amended version of one of these bills, entitled "The Equal
Access Act," which limited participation in equal access religious clubs
to students and barred teachers or school officials from influencing reli-
gious activities, was reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee on
61. The "Hatch" amendment-sponsored by Senator Hatch in March 1983-provided
for voluntary "silent prayer or meditation in public schools," S.J. Res. 212, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 1, and "equal access," S.J. Res. 212, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2, 130 CONG. REc. 93
(daily ed. Jan. 24, 1984). This amendment later developed into the Dixon Amendment, which
contained both the silent prayer and the equal access provisions. S. 2782, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
§§ 1-2, 130 CONG. REc. 2678 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1984). The scope of the amendment ex-
tended to both public elementary and secondary schools. Id. The Dixon Amendment was
considered in conjunction with a vocal prayer amendment sponsored by the Reagan Adminis-
tration. S.J. Res. 73, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. 3973 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1983).
These amendments resulted from an electoral campaign advocating school prayer. See
Reagan As Pandora, N.Y. Times, July 30, 1984, at A21, (Op. ed.); Religion Finds A Way to Go
to School, N.Y. Times, July 29, 1984, § 6 (Week in Review), at 16, col. 3 ("The importance
attached to the school-prayer issue in 1984 reflects the remarkable success of conservatives-
and the Reagan administration-in bringing the cause back into the political and legal
mainstream.").
62. See N.Y. Times, March 21, 1984, at B7, col. 1.
63. See S. 425, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2, 129 CONG. REc. 972 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1983)
(prohibiting federal funding to schools which do not allow religious clubs); S. 1059, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 3, 129 CONG. REc. 476 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1983) (providing a federal court
remedy for denial of access); H. 2732, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1-2, 129 CONG. REC. 2638
(daily ed. Apr. 26, 1983) (prohibiting federal funding to schools which deny equal access).
64. See Sen. Jud. Comm. Equal Access Hearings, supra note 5. For examples of testimony
objecting on constitutional grounds but limited to the scope of S. 1059, see id. at 271 (testi-
mony, John W. Baker, General Counsel, Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs and of the
National Council of Churches of Christ (NCC)).
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February 22, 1984.65
As alternatives to the Hatch Amendment and to the initial bills al-
lowing equal access at the elementary school level, equal access bills lim-
ited in scope to secondary school students were introduced in both the
Senate66 and the House.6 7 These bills, virtually identical, provided that
the protected clubs must be voluntary and student-initiated. In addition,
the House bill barred school sponsorship of the clubs.68 The bills gave
rise to the Religious Speech Protection Act, which expressly allowed stu-
dent-initiated prayer meetings in the secondary schools during nonin-
structional hours and barred school sponsorship of the clubs.6 9
The narrowed scope of the Religious Speech Protection Act created
broad-based support for the concept of equal access contained in that
bill. Even traditional advocates of church/state separation favored the
concept and worked with the various congressional committees on refin-
ing statutory language.7° Despite this strong support, the Religious
65. S. 1059, § 2(a) as reported in S. REP. No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984). The
remedy for violation of S. 1059 was a cause of action brought by an individual Attorney Gen-
eral rather than a funds cutoff. See S. 1059 §§ 3-4, reported in id., at 2. School employees
were permitted to monitor student groups but not to participate.
66. S. 815, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 3-4,printed in 129 CONG. REc. 2933 (Mar. 15, 1983)
[hereinafter cited as S. 815].
67. H.R. 4172, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 4172].
68. H.R. 4172 § 3.
69. The Act, later renamed the Equal Access Act, consisted in the Senate of a revised S.
815, and its House companion bill, H.R. 5345, successor to H.R. 4172, numbered in hearings
as H.R. 4996. Proposed revised S. 815, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. Rac. 2433 (daily ed.
Mar. 8, 1984). H.R. 5345, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 5345]
changed the penalty for denial of equal access from the judicial remedy provided in H.R. 4172
to a funds cutoff.
70. See, e.g., Sen. Jud. Comm. Equal Access Hearings, supra note 5, at 271 (statement of
John W. Baker, General Counsel for the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs and of the
National Council of Churches, U.S.A. (NCC), testifying in support of S. 1059); Religious
Speech Protection Act Hearings, supra note 11, at 30, 96 (prepared statements by representa-
tives of the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs and of the NCC).
NCC's support came with certain'provisos: e.g., that the clubs should be limited to the
secondary schools; faculty supervision should be in a "custodial" rather than a "participant"
capacity; and that no rights should be accorded to outsiders. Sen. Jud. Comm. Equal Access
Hearings, supra note 5, at 226-28. The NCC also proposed specific language concerning the
voluntariness of the club activity, which was added to one of the proposed bills. Id. at 229
(prepared statement of NCC).
Further, the NCC favored restricting equal access to circumstances in which the school
had created a "limited public forum." Id. at 227. See Religious Speech Protection Act Hear-
ings, supra note 11, at 97 (statement of Rev. D. Kelley, Director, Religious and Civil Liberty,
NCC). According to the NCC's "limited public forum" theory, the schools would be bound to
allow prayer clubs only when the school permits student-initiated prayers that are not related
to "curricular" departments. Id. Thus, if a school permits a chess club, it has created a limited
public forum "to which religion can legitimately seek access," whereas a French club, glee
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Speech Protection Act was narrowly defeated in the House.7 1
The constitutionality of equal access legislative proposals was ques-
tioned primarily by religious minority groups.72 In Congress, opponents
of the Religious Speech Protection Act supported a bill known as the
Secondary School Equality of Access Act. This bill differed from the
Religious Speech Protection Act, and all similar prior initiatives, by pro-
viding protection from discrimination for all speech, not just religious
speech.73 This "free speech" approach was to become the thesis of the
final Equal Access Act.
club, and football club are related to school departments and do not create a limited public
forum to which a religious right of access would attach. Id.
Another separationist group, Americans United For Separation of Church and State, also
has expressed support for equal access. See Brief for Americans United for Separation of
Church and State as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs, Bell v. Little Axe Indep. School
Dist., 766 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1985) (favoring high school equal access).
71. 130 CONG. REC. H3901 (daily ed. May 15, 1984). For the debate concerning that
vote, see id. at H3855-79.
72. Constitutional challenges were raised chiefly by Jewish human rights defense groups.
See Sen. Jud. Comm. Equal Access Hearings, supra note 5, at 229 (testimony of Ruti Teitel,
Ass't. Dir., Legal Affairs, Anti-Defamation League); id. at 255 (testimony of Marc Pearl, Am.
Jewish Cong.); Religious Speech Protection Act Hearings, supra note 70, at 109 (testimony of
Ruti Teitel); id. at 57 (testimony of Barry Ungar, Am. Jewish Cong.).
The Seventh Day Adventists and Lutheran Council commented negatively on equal ac-
cess because it required teacher supervision of religious clubs, but they did not oppose the Act.
See id. at 105, 107 (prepared statement of Dr. Carl Bergstrom); id. at 103 (statement of Mitch
Tyner, Legal Counsel, Gen. Conference of Seventh Day Adventists). Similarly, Americans for
Religious Liberty opposed the bill because of concerns about proselytizing and divisiveness.
Id. at 99 (prepared statement of Edward Doerr, Exec. Dir., Americans for Religious Liberty).
Establishment objections also were raised against H.R. 4996 by the National Education
Association (NEA) and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). See Religious Speech
Protection Act Hearings, supra note 70, at 42, (statement of Linda Tarr-Whelan, NEA); id. at
79 (statement of Rev. Barry Lynn, legislative counsel, ACLU) (establishment problem posed
by youth and impressionability of high school children). The ACLU reached its Establish-
ment Clause position after arguing earlier only that the Religious Speech Protection Act was
imprudent because it provided a general rule in an area in which the Constitution, after
Widmar, required case-by-case analysis. See J. Novik, The Constitutionality of Extra-Curricu-
lar Use of Public School Facilities for Religious Activities (April 26, 1983) (ACLU Memoran-
dum).
The Religious Speech Protection Act's mandate as limited to religious speech was charac-
terized by the ACLU and by the Seventh Day Adventists as granting a special benefit to reli-
gion. See Religious Speech Protection Act Hearings, supra note 70, at 78 (statement of Barry
Lynn, legislative counsel, ACLU); id. at 105 (statement of Mitch Tyner, Legal Counsel, Gen.
Conference of Seventh Day Adventists).
73. The Secondary School Equality of Access Act, H.R. 5439, did not expressly protect
school religious clubs from discrimination, but rather opened access for all types of clubs in the
secondary schools and prohibited discrimination "on the grounds of the content of speech
which occurs or may occur at such meeting." H.R. 5439. Under the bill, the remedy for a
violation was a civil action for damages.
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After over two years of hearings and committee votes on a variety of
equal access bills, the Senate and the House passed the Equal Access Act
in an amendment to an education bill.7 4 As stated by its proponents, the
purpose of the Act was to afford secondary school students who wish to
gather for religious activities in the schools the same rights of association
as those who gather for other purposes, such as "to discuss chess, poli-
tics, or philosophy."75 However, unlike its unsuccessful predecessors,
which dealt only with religious clubs, the final version of the Equal Ac-
cess Act, like the Secondary School Equality of Access Act, protected all
student associations from discrimination on the basis of "religious, polit-
ical, philosophical, or any other content of the speech at such meet-
ings."7 6 The wording of the Act attracted a varied coalition, including
evangelical supporters of the earlier equal access legislation and civil lib-
ertarians who opposed a preference for religion but favored increased
protection for other access to the schools.7 7
During the passage of the Equal Access Act and thereafter, three
federal circuit courts of appeals held equal access policies to violate the
74. There were strong majorities in favor of the Act. The Act passed in the Senate by a
vote of 88 to I1 on June 28, 1984, 130 CONG. REc. S8440 (daily ed. June 28, 1984), and in the
House by a vote of 337 to 77 on July 25, 1984, 130 CONG. REc. H7740-41 (daily ed. July 25,
1984).
75. See 130 CONG. REc. S8335 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (comments of Sen. Denton); id.
at S8337 (remarks of Sen. Hatfield).
76. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a).
Although the earlier equal access bills had provided for a funds cut-off in case of violation,
see S. 425, supra note 63 and subsequent bills such as S. 1059 and the Religious Speech Protec-
tion Act, which provides for a private right of action, the Equal Access Act provided no en-
forcement provision whatsoever. S. REP. No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 24, reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2348.
77. Evangelical groups and their advocates, such as the Christian Legal Society and the
National Association of Evangelicals, had supported the equal access legislation from the be-
ginning. See, e. g., Memorandum, Christian Legal Society reprinted in 129 CONG. REc. S2935
(daily ed. Mar. 15, 1983); Sen. Jud Comm. Equal Access Hearings, supra note 5, at 106-16,
176-79.
The ACLU and the NEA dropped their opposition to equal access when the concept of
protecting all speech, contained in H.R. 5439, was adopted. The ACLU policy maintains that
the Equal Access Act allows organized student clubs to engage in religious speech or discus-
sion, but not worship. In support of this theory and in exchange for discontinuing its opposi-
tion to the Act, the ACLU requested Senator Hatfield to insert into the record language
indicating such a limit. This language, however, conflicts both with portions of the text of the
Act and with its legislative history, which indicates that it seeks to extend Widmar to high
schools and to overrule Brandon and Lubbock. See Sen. Jud. Comm. Equal Access Hearings,
supra note 5.
The legislative history of the Equal Access Act indicates mass confusion over the nature
and scope of the Act toward the end of the legislative process. As a result of this confusion,
the Act drew support from "liberal" congressmen such as Senator Barney Frank who declared
the Act "the best empowerment of teen-agers that's come along." Religion Finds A Way To Go
To School, N.Y. Times, July 29, 1984, § 6 (Week in Review), at 16, col. 3.
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Establishment Clause.78 In Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dis-
trict, 7 9 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit disallowed high school
religious meetings during a regularly scheduled activity period under
teacher supervision at the beginning of the school day. The court held
that although a free speech right existed comparable to that in a public
university, this right in a high school setting was overridden by establish-
ment clause concerns.8" Similarly, in Nartowicz v. Clayton County School
District,"1 the Eleventh Circuit held that a school district's practice of
permitting a student religious group to meet on school property, after
hours and under faculty supervision, contravened the Establishment
Clause.8 2
With the addition of Little Axe, Bender, and Nartowicz to the Bran-
don and Lubbock decisions, five federal courts of appeals had found reli-
gious meetings unconstitutional regardless of whether they occurred
before, during, or after the school day.8 3 Pitted against these five deci-
sions is the Act, sanctioning the very scenario these cases prohibit: or-
ganized student religious meetings taking place on school premises,
under teacher supervision, at times associated with the school day.84 The
theory of equal access recognizes the extent of government sponsorship
78. Bell v. Little Axe Indep. School Dist., 766 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1985) (striking equal
access policy in elementary school and junior high school); Bender v. Williamsport Area
School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984) (upholding district court on its limited forum char-
acterization of high school but reversing the establishment violation finding); Nartowicz v.
Clayton County School Dist., 736 F.2d 646 (11th Cir. 1984) (striking equal access policy al-
lowing after school student prayer group based on degree of school involvement).
79. 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984).
80. Id. at 559-60. Paramount to the court's establishment clause conclusion were the
facts that meetings were held on school premises, under teacher supervision, and within the
scope of the state compulsory attendance laws.
81. 736 F.2d 646 (llth Cir. 1984).
82. No free speech issue was raised. Id. at 649.
83. Little Axe, 776 F.2d 1391 (clubs meeting before classes but after buses deposited
school children deemed to occur within the "school day"); Bender, 741 F.2d 538 (clubs meet-
ing during an activity period that occurred about 12 minutes into the school day); Nartowicz,
736 F.2d 646 (after the school day); Lubbock, 669 F.2d 1038 (before and after the school day);
Brandon, 635 F.2d 971 (voluntary clubs before the school day). See also Collins v. Chandler
Unified School Dist., 644 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1981) (disallowing voluntary prayers at student
council meetings held during the school day).
84. The Nartowicz, Lubbock, and Brandon holdings proscribe religious activity during the
same time periods that the Equal Access Act permits-before and after the hours of compul-
sory school attendance. Thus, these holdings conflict directly with the Act. The United States
Solicitor General, in his Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
2 n.2, Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 518 (1985), claims
that the Equal Access Act is not confined to the hours outside of the compulsory attendance
laws and that it therefore conflicts not only with Nartowicz, Lubbock and Brandon, but also
with Bender, which concerns an activities period occurring during the school day. Id.
Notwithstanding the Solicitor General's arguments to the contrary, significant legislative his-
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of religious activities in the public schools, but responds that this spon-
sorship is permissible because first, all religions are aided equally, and
second, a broad range of nonreligious activities also benefit. To the ex-
tent that the equal access theory relies on a view of the Establishment
Clause that permits nonpreferential aid to religion, it challenges long-
standing establishment principles barring government aid to "any and all
religions."85 To the extent it calls for equal treatment of religious and
secular groups based on open forum principles, it relies on an erroneous
characterization of the public school and of the student religious activi-
ties therein.86
II. Equal Access and the Establishment Clause
A. The "Origination" of the Religious Activity-Irrelevance to
Establishment Inquiry
Equal access analysis distinguishes between student-initiated reli-
gious activities and those initiated by the state legislature or the school.87
According to this "initiation" or "origination" approach, the genesis of
the religious activity determines the constitutional result. Only when the
state initiates a religious activity-as opposed to sanctions, recognizes, or
assists it-is government sponsorship considered sufficient to constitute
an impermissible establishment.88 Prayer activity originating with stu-
dents is viewed not to constitute an establishment problem, because the
tory of the Act indicates that its scope is limited to the hours outside of compulsory attend-
ance. See infra note 216.
85. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947). See supra note 20. The Supreme
Court consistently has applied the establishment principle that government may not aid any or
all religions. See Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216, 3221-32 (1985) ("The
Establishment Clause... primarily proscribes 'sponsorship, financial support'. . ."); Abington
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222; McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. at 210. This principle
appears to be under some attack, see supra notes 5 & 18, and may already have begun to erode.
See Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1362 (1984) (advocating a departure from the Lemon
test, see infra note 101 and accompanying text, and using language promoting a more fluid
establishment analysis not confined to "any single test or criterion.").
86. See supra notes 5 & 18. See, e.g., Toms & Whitehead, The Religious Student in Public
Education: Resolving a Constitutional Dilemma, 27 EMORY L.L 3, 27-30 (1978) (arguing a
free exercise right and hence no alternative to government support of organized religious activ-
ities in the public schools); Note, Religious Expression in the Public School Forum: The High
School Student's Right to Free Speech, 72 GEo. L.L 135, 138-39 (1983) (advocating that in a
public forum, the government must be content-neutral and treat religious and nonreligious
activities equally). But see infra notes 297-323 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 19. The first proviso of the Equal Access Act is that student meetings
must be "voluntary and student-initiated." 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(1). (For full text of Act, see
supra note 30.)
88. See, eg., Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1040. The Lubbock School District hoped to cure the
unconstitutionality of Bible reading, religious assemblies, and daily prayer occurring on cam-
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state is not involved in initiating the prayer activity. 9 Allowance of stu-
dent-initiated prayer meetings is characterized not as sponsorship or
sanction but as mere "accommodation." 90
The theoretical underpinnings of this distinction derive from a con-
struction of the Widmar decision that grounds the constitutionality of
the university prayer club on its student-initiation. 91 Proponents of the
"origination" theory similarly distinguish the McCollum v. Board of Ed-
ucation,92 Engel v. Vitale,93 and Abington School District v. Schempp94
pus by instructing "that the practices should be student rather than teacher initiated." Id. See
generally articles cited supra note 19.
This argument had significant appeal for the equal access proponents in Congress. See
supra note 19. It is also the central argument for the petitioners in the Bender case. Through-
out their brief on appeal, petitioners seek to distinguish the high school prayer club at issue
from prior Establishment Clause precedent by emphasizing equal access student initiation. See
Brief for Petitioners at 10, 11, 15, 20, 25, 37, Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., No.
84-773: "The establishment clause decisions of this Court have required the prohibition of
state-initiated, not self-initiated, religious speech." Id. at 11. But cf McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. at 209-12, in which the religious activity was not initiated by the state, but
rather by outside religious leaders-ultimately at some parental initiative. Nonetheless, the
Court held the state's aid to religion to be unconstitutional when it allowed outside religious
teachers the use of school premises to teach religious classes during the school day. Id.
89. See, e.g., Bender, 741 F.2d at 369 (Adams, J., dissenting) (to deny these students the
right to meet ... is to ignore the fundamental differences between self-initiated and state-
sponsored religious activities). House Religious Speech Protection Act Hearings, supra note 11,
at 45 (prepared statement of Laurence Tribe, Professor, Harvard Law School) (characterizing
equal access as "voluntary, student-initiated and student-led religious observance"); S. REP.
No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1984) ("An equal access policy in which the State merely
permits student-initiated religious activity on the same basis as the student-initiated activity is
very different from state-initiated activity."); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Bender v. Williamsport Area School District at
19 (emphasizing "self-initiated extracurricular activity" at issue in Bender).
90. See, e.g., Note, The Constitutionality of Student-Initiated Religious Meetings on Public
Grounds, 50 U. CIN. L. REv. 740, 742 (1981). The "accommodation" theory derives from the
free speech analysis used in Widmar. The Court there referred to the university's open forum
policy as one of "accommodating" the meetings of student groups. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267.
See Note, supra note 86, at 141.
The application of the Widmar free speech accommodation theory to high school prayer
clubs has been blurred with the theory of "accommodation" used in free exercise analysis. See
Toms & Whitehead, supra note 86, at 11, for characterization of Supreme Court's Establish-
ment Clause approach as "accommodating neutrality," which permits "accommodation to and
preference of religion in order to safeguard free exercise values." See generally M. McConnell,
Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. - (to be published). Cf. Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding unconstitutional application of state employment compensation
provisions denying benefits to Jehovah's Witness who would not work on the Sabbath); Zorach
v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952) (allowing release-time for religious study off school
premises).
91. See supra note 19.
92. 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (religious instruction at religious outsider/parental initiative).
93. 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (state initiated prayer).
94. 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (state initiated Bible reading).
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decisions, which respectively bar religious instruction, prayer, and Bible
reading in public schools during the school day. These religious activi-
ties, equal access theory claims, rise to a level of constitutional concern
because they are not initiated by the students.95 However, as this Article
shall demonstrate, the establishment analysis developed by the Supreme
Court considers the origins of a particular religious activity to be imma-
terial to the question of state sponsorship. The Court's public school
prayer cases- McCollum, Engel, and Abington-as well as its university
prayer case-Widmar-are consistent with the four high school equal
access appellate court cases-Bender, Nartowicz, Lubbock, and Brandon.
Together they provide a framework for establishment analysis that cen-
ters upon the extent of government sponsorship or support for religious
activities. Accordingly, government sponsorship, and not the origin of
religious activity, justifies the differing treatment of equal access in the
public schools as opposed to its treatment in other forums.
B. The Establishment Test
1. Relevance of Establishment Test-Equal Access Prayer is Still Prayer
Equal access activities trigger establishment clause review when
those activities are religious in nature. Where equal access has been liti-
gated, the activity for which students have sought school access is organ-
ized prayer.96 To the extent that Bible reading and religious discussion
95. In Congress, Equal Access Act proponents proclaimed: "The facts in McCollum, En-
gel, and Schempp contrast sharply with those in the situations to which S. 1059 would apply.
In all three cases, the State did not merely allow the religious activity, but initiated it....
None of the cases concerned a student-initiated and student-run activity." S. REP. No. 357,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 28, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2348, 2374.
Despite the irrelevance of Engel and Abington to the issue of student-initiated religious
expression, some courts have persisted in viewing those cases as a virtual bar to any religious
expression by public school students. See Religious Speech Protection Act Hearings, supra note
11, at 88 (prepared statement of Robert P. Dugan, Jr., Director, Office of Pub. Affairs, Nat'l
Ass'n of Evangelicals); Petition For a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit at 19-20; Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (con-
trasting Abington, Engel, and McCollum with the "self-initiation" in Bender); see also supra
notes 19 & 89.
The equal access initiation analysis is spurious as concerns McCollum, 333 U.S. 203
(1948), which involved religious study on school premises not at school initiative, but rather at
that of outside religious leaders and parents.
96. For example, in Widmar, access to university facilities was "for purposes of religious
worship or religious teaching." Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265. Similarly, in Bender, the Petros
Club requested of the Williamsport School District a school club period to pray, read scrip-
tures, and discuss religious questions. 741 F.2d at 542.
In Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at 424, the Supreme Court held that the Regents' prayer at
issue was "a religious activity." Reaffirming the trial court's holding, the Court declared "[t]he
religious nature of prayer was recognized by Jefferson and has been concurred in by theologi-
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are also involved, outside of the context of an objective presentation or
study of the Bible for its literary and historic qualities, these activities too
are religious.97 Thus, student-initiated prayers, Bible reading, and discus-
sion groups organized in the public schools, at times associated with the
school day, under teacher supervision, paid for by state and federal taxes
intermingle religion and state involvement and trigger first amendment
establishment review. 98
The traditional establishment analysis is set forth in the three-prong
test articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman.99 A government policy will not
offend the Establishment Clause only if under its specific facts the policy
passes all three requirements: "First, the [governmental policy] must
have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion... ; finally, [the
policy] must not foster an excessive government entanglement with reli-
gion. ''1°° This test was applied initially in Lemon to bar direct financial
aid to religious institutions. It has since been used, with few exceptions,
to determine the constitutionality of other government activity that alleg-
cal writers, the United States Supreme Court and State courts and administrative officials
.... " Id. at 425.
The religious nature of prayer was recently reaffirmed in Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897
(5th Cir. 1981) (concerning voluntary morning student prayer before classes), aff'd, 455 U.S.
913 (1982). In striking a statute and accompanying school board regulations allowing prayers
at the beginning of the school day, the court defined prayer as "an address of entreaty, suppli-
cation, praise, or thanksgiving directed to some sacred or divine spirit, being, or object. That it
may contemplate some wholly secular objective cannot alter the inherently religious character
of the exercise." 653 F.2d at 901. The court held "[p]rayer is perhaps the quintessential reli-
gious practice. . . . [S]ince prayer is a primary religious activity in itself . . . [e]ven if the
avowed objective of the legislature and school board is not itself strictly religious, it is sought
to be achieved through the observance of an intrinsically religious practice." Id.
97. As the Court noted in Abington, "[Tihe place of the Bible as an instrument of religion
cannot be gainsaid .... " 374 U.S. at 224. Discussion about religion, according to the Supreme
Court in Widmar, cannot be distinguished from prayer. 454 U.S. at 269 n.6. These religious
activities are permissible when presented in a curricular context. See Stone v. Graham, 449
U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (citing approvingly Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 (1963)) (dicta
upholding study of religion or the Bible when presented objectively as part of a secular pro-
gram of education)).
98. The constitutional bar on state-sponsored prayer, both vocal and silent, has recently
withstood challenge. Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985) (striking Alabama moment of
silence for prayer legislation), aff'g in relevant part, 705 F.2d 1526 (1lth Cir. 1983). See also
Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd, 455 U.S. 913 (1982). Because prayer is
the activity at issue, equal access activities cannot be dismissed as posing no establishment
concern, as would a comparative religion course integrated into the school curriculum. See
Stone, 449 U.S. at 42 (citing Abington, 374 U.S. at 225). The Court in Abington and Stone
hypothetically approved the objective study of the Ten Commandments and the Bible inte-
grated into the school curriculum.
99. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
100. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271 (citing approvingly to Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13).
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edly aids religion.1"'
2. Standard For Unconstitutional Sponsorship
a. Religious Purpose
For an equal access policy to pass establishment review, it must
have a secular purpose." 2 Its absence alone has invalidated such govern-
ment practices as the display of the Ten Commandments on public
school walls.'0 3 Whether the existence of any secular purpose suffices, or
whether the purpose must be "clearly secular," is not resolved in the case
law. Although the original Lemon test required only a finding of a secu-
lar purpose, the standard used by the Court in Stone v. Graham'°4 re-
quires the government to have a "clearly secular [legislative] purpose" to
pass establishment muster. 105 On the other hand, the recent decisions in
Wallace v. Jaffree and Lynch v. Donnelly seem to revert back to the ear-
lier formulation of the Lemon test and require only a finding of any secu-
lar purpose.10 6 This weak purpose test allowed the Court in Lynch to
sustain city sponsorship of a Christmas nativity scene. Whether the test
101. See, eg., Wallace v. Jaifree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2489-90 (1985) (Lemon test); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1362 (1984) (applying Lemon to determine constitutionality of
government aid to city-sponsored religious display); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271
(1981); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (disallowing posting of the Ten Commandments
on wall of public school classroom).
The Court in certain recent cases has departed from the Lemon test and employed a
historical test, Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding constitutionality of state
legislative chaplaincies based on historical first Congress), and a strict scrutiny test, Larson v.
Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (holding tax statute preference to certain religions unconstitu-
tional). Also, in Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1362, the Court declared it was not "confined to any
single test or criterion." However, although the Court prefaced its use of the test with qualify-
ing language, indicating that the test was not dispositive, but was useful only for guidance, id.
at 1362, the Court then proceeded to apply the Lemon test straightforwardly to the question of
the constitutionality of a city-sponsored nativity scene. Id. at 1370 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The Court has consistently applied the Lemon test in cases concerning religious activities
in the schools. It was applied most recently in the 1984-85 Term in Wallace v. Jaifree, 105 S.
Ct. 2479 (1985) (holding moment of silent prayer legislation unconstitutional). See also Agui-
lar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985); Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216
(1985).
102. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
103. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980) (no preeminent secular purpose in
posting).
104. Id.
105. Id. The requirement of a "clearly secular legislative purpose" derives from Commit-
tee of Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973).
106. 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1362 (1984). Pursuant to the majority opinion in Lynch, even if the
purpose of a government practice was almost entirely religious, one secular purpose is sufficient
to buoy the practice under the establishment test. The city's "secular" purpose-the celebra-
tion of Christmas-was held sufficient to allow city sponsorship of the religious symbol as part
of a holiday display. Id. at 1363.
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enunciated in Stone-which involved religious activity in the public
schools-will survive the Jaffree and Lynch reformulation may be ad-
dressed again in the current Term.1°7
i. The Purpose of Equal Access Policies-The Case Law
Notwithstanding the scrutiny applied to the government's secular
purpose, the Lemon inquiry requires examination of the particular gov-
ernmental intent of the statute or policy at issue. 108 In Widmar, the cen-
tral factors considered by the Supreme Court to determine "intent" were
first, the role of the timing of the adoption by the educational institution
of the equal access policy and second, its intended use as expressed by the
text of that policy.' 09 Lower courts also have inferred intent from the
timing of a school's decision to adopt an equal access policy.110 When the
adoption of the policy is prior to the religious activity request, the text of
the policy is secular and does not reflect a purpose of facilitating religious
activities; and when the school denies a request for application of an
equal access policy to religious activities, the purpose of the policy has
been sustained as secular. 11
107. In the 1985-86, Term the Court will consider several cases concerning the Establish-
ment Clause, at least two of which concern religion and public education: Bender v. Williams-
port Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 518 (1985)
(constitutionality of student-initiated prayer clubs); Witters v. Washington, 54 U.S.L.W. 4135,
No. 84-1070 (Jan. 27, 1986) (upholding constitutionality of vocational rehabilitation aid to be
used in religious ministry studies).
108. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct.
2479 (1985); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); ACLU v. Rabun, 698 F.2d 1098 (1lth Cir.
1983) (cross in public park unconstitutional); May v. Cooperman, 572 F. Supp. 1561 (D.N.J.
1983), appeal dismissed, No. 83-5890 (3d Cir. Dec. 24, 1985) (affirming district court finding of
unconstitutional religious purpose to moment of silence statute).
109. 454 U.S. at 271 n.10.
110. The role of the school in defining unconstitutional government purpose is emphasized
in Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980). For cases where school action has resulted in absence
of religious purpose see infra note 111.
111. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981) (pre-existing open forum policy with
intent of providing for exchange of ideas has a secular purpose); Bender v. Williamsport Area
School Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 551 (1984) (in finding no religious objective on the part of the
school, the court focused on the preexisting nature of the policy and on the school's denial of
the student request: "[N]o assertion has been made that the Williamsport school district cre-
ated the activity period for anything other than valid educational purposes .... [I]t would be
highly ironic if the school district, which has been opposing introduction of Petros into the
school ... were to be charged with a religious motive .... (emphasis in original)); Brandon v.
Board of Educ., 635 F.2d at 978 (upholding district court finding of secular purpose: "A
neutral policy granting all student groups, including religious organizations, access to school
facilities reflects a secular, and clearly permissible purpose-the encouragement of extracurric-
ular activities"); Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1,
12, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43, 49 (1977) (considering preexisting school club policy and denial of use of
school premises, the court found that the allowance of school premises to school clubs is "in
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In Widmar, the secular nature of the university's equal access policy
was evidenced by the university's statement of the secular intent "to pro-
vide a forum in which students can exchange ideas," and upon the preex-
isting nature of the forum. 1 ? The fact that the policy predated the
request by the religious group showed that the school could not have
intended to sponsor the views of the religious group. 113 This secular pur-
pose was arguably further supported by the university's denial of the re-
quest for use of the forum by the religious club.
In contrast, courts have found an impermissible religious purpose on
the part of the school when equal access policies are adopted subsequent
to a student request for prayer clubs or other religious activities, " 4 when
the policy refers explicitly to religious activities," 5 and when the school
consents to application of this policy for religious use."
1 6
Thus, in Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Independent
School District, 117 at issue was the constitutionality of an equal access
policy adopted after nine years of Bible distributions and school spon-
sored prayers and Bible readings over the school public address sys-
tem. 18 The filing of an action challenging these school practices' 9
the abstract secular in nature"); Keegan v. University of Del., 349 A.2d 14, 16 (Del. 1975) (a
university policy allowing religious clubs the "same rights and privileges" allowed other group
activities "would not reflect a sectarian legislative purpose"). See also Nartowicz v. Clayton
County School Dist., 736 F.2d 646 (1lth Cir. 1984) (religious group meetings on school prem-
ises and under teacher supervision found to have unconstitutional sectarian purpose, in light of
school's apparent support of religious assemblies, signs, announcements, etc.). But see Trietley
v. Board of Educ., 65 A.D.2d 1, 8, 409 N.Y.S.2d 912, 916 (1978) (finding religious purpose to
high school prayer club by projecting to the school the intent of the high school students,
which was concededly religious, notwithstanding the fact that the city board of education had
denied the students' request for access).
112. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 272 n.10:
Because this case involves a forum already made generally available to student
groups, it differs from those cases in which this Court has invalidated statutes permit-
ting school facilities to be used for instruction by religious groups, but not by others.
See, eg., McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). In those cases the
school may appear to sponsor the views of the speaker.
The preexisting nature of the forum indicates the accessibility of the forum for nonreligious
activities and is often a measure of religious purpose and effect. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 272-
74; infra text accompanying notes 288-96, 306-13.
113. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271 n.10.
114. E.g., Bell v. Little Axe Indep. School Dist., 766 F.2d 1391, 1403 (10th Cir. 1985)
("Most importantly, the District's ultimate motive is revealed by its subsequent implementa-
tions of policy."); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d
1038 (5th Cir. 1982).
115. E.g., Lubbock, 669 F.2d 1038.
116. Id. at 1043; Collins v. Chandler Unified School Dist., 644 F.2d 749, 759 (9th Cir.
1981).
117. 669 F.2d at 1038.
118. Id. at 1039, 1040.
119. Id at 1040.
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prompted adoption by the school of an equal access policy allowing vol-
untary student meetings "for any educational, moral, religious or ethical
purposes." 120 Although the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit made
no specific reference to the timing of the policy, it reversed the district
court and concluded that the policy was unconstitutional. 121 The pream-
ble of the policy, according to the court, indicated that it was "concerned
with religious belief and the place of religion in the public schools."' 22
The court concluded that "the purpose of this policy, ostensibly devised
to allow many groups to meet, when examined in the context of the total
school policy, is more clearly designed to allow the meetings of religious
groups."1 2
3
A similar religious purpose has been found when a school consents
to a student request for equal access. In Collins v. Chandler Unified
School District, a religious purpose was found when the student council
led voluntary prayers in a school assembly with school district
permission. 121
ii. The Equal Access Act-Impermissible Religious Purpose
The religious purpose of the Equal Access Act is reflected both in
its legislative history and in its text. The legislative history of the Act
spanning two years and many predecessor bills that focused exclusively
on religious activities, reflects the congressional purpose of facilitating
religious prayer meetings in the schools. 25 This religious purpose ulti-
mately advances a sectarian religious purpose by berefitting those evan-
gelical religions that would derive the greatest gain through access to the
public schools. 126
The earliest of the predecessor bills provided for officially sanctioned
voluntary prayer clubs at both elementary and high school levels without
limits on faculty participation or school sponsorship.1 27 A subsequent
proposal, the Religious Speech Protection Act, limited school sponsor-
ship and membership in the clubs to secondary school students, but con-
120. Id. at 1041.
121. Id. at 1044-45.
122. Id. at 1044 (emphasis in original).
123. Id. at 1045 (emphasis added).
124. 644 F.2d 759, 762 (9th Cir. 1981).
125. See 129 CONG. REC. S2933-34 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1983) (statement of Sen. Hatfield).
See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text. See also 130 CONG. REC. S8331, 8334-36 (daily
ed. June 27, 1984) (remarks of Sens. Hatch and Denton).
126. See infra note 130; Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (positing an empirical
evidence inquiry regarding religion as the ultimate beneficiary of an equal access policy). Cf
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
127. See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
tinued to provide protection only for voluntary religious clubs.128 All of
the bills, including the final Act, permitted outsider attendance and par-
ticipation in the equal access meetings 29 -a reason for the strong sup-
port of equal access legislation among evangelical religious groups. 130
The legislative history of the previous bills and the final Act indi-
cates that although the specific references to religion in the predecessor
bills were deleted, the Act nevertheless retains their religious purpose.
131
128. See supra note 69.
129. See 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(5) (Supp. 1985).
130. Sectarian religious purpose may be more problematic for establishment clause scru-
tiny than a nondenominational religious purpose. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982)
(striking Minnesota tax statute affording preferential tax exemptions to religion). Evangelists
have been preeminent advocates of equal access both in the courts and in Congress. The im-
portance of equal access to the evangelists derives from the importance they ascribe to prosely-
tizing. The major evangelical organizations have set up high school programs including
Young Life and Campus Crusade for Christ, through which youth ministers seek to enter the
schools to speak to students, both informally and through youth assemblies. See Young Life
Youth Ministries Activities Raise Policy Issues For Educators, EDUC. WEEK, Oct. 28, 1983, at
1, 14. Such proselytizing youth assemblies were at issue in both Lubbock Civil Liberties Union
v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982) and Nartowicz v. Clayton
County School Dist., 736 F.2d 646 01th Cir. 1984). Moreover, both cases involved church use
of school media, including bulletin boards and loudspeakers. Lubbock 669 F.2d at 1039-40;
Nartowicz, 736 F.2d at 649. See also Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265 n.2 (organization of evangelical
students); Equal Access: A First Amendment Question, 1983: Hearings on S. 815 and S. 1059
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 140 (1983) (statement of
Charles Klein, Campus Crusade for Christ, indicating evangelical desire to use school media to
announce equal access meetings).
Advocates for evangelicals such as the Christian Legal Society claim to be either counsel
for plaintiffs or amicus in every equal access case. See, e.g., Religious Speech Protection Act,
1984: Hearings on H.R. 4996 Before the Subcomm. on Elementary, Secondary and Vocational
Educ. of the House Comm. on Educ and Labor, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1984) (statement of
Samuel E. Ericsson, Director, Washington Office, Christian Legal Society). The Christian
Legal Society is handling the appeal in Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d
562 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 518 (1985), possibly unbeknownst to the Court
because the address on the brief is a post office box. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, id. (Samuel Ericsson, counsel of record
and director, Washington Office, Christian Legal Society). In Congress, the chief sponsor of
equal access legislation, Senator Hatfield, is himself a financial supporter and member of the
board of Young Life. See supra Young Life Youth Ministries. In the Congressional hearings
on proposed equal access legislation, the National Association for Evangelicals has testified
repeatedly. See, e.g., Religious Speech Protection Act, 1984: Hearings, supra, at 91 (statement
of Forest Montgomery, Counsel, National Association of Evangelicals).
131. Even the legislative history, which attempts to disguise the religious purpose and
speaks of a secular purpose, does not mitigate the religious purpose of the Act. See 130 CONG.
REC. 58337 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Hatfield) ("The Senator from Alabama
has spoken about religious activities .... I believe you can equally present this case as purely a
matter of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly."). For the establishment test, the Court
has held the scope of inquiry to go beyond an "avowed secular purpose." See, e.g., Stone v.
Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (despite legislature's claim of secular purpose, the Court
found religious purpose in posting of Ten Commandments); May v. Cooperman, 572 F. Supp.
1561 (D.N.J. 1983) (district court held moment of silence statute unconstitutional on evidence
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The legislative history of the final Act includes express statements con-
cerning the Act's intent to overrule such decisions as Brandon v. Board of
Education132 and Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Independent
School District.33
The text of the Equal Access Act also indicates a religious purpose.
Many provisions of the statute are devoted to protecting religious activi-
ties from establishment challenge by seeking to limit the extent of gov-
ernment sponsorship of those activities. These provisions, which are
constitutionally immaterial to any other type of meeting, reflect the Act's
true purpose of facilitating prayer activities. These provisions include
requirements that the meetings be voluntary and student-initiated; 3 and
that meetings not be sponsored by the school, the government, or its
agents or employees.' 35 Outsiders may attend and participate, but may
not direct, conduct, control or regularly attend the meetings.136 Employ-
ees of the school may be present at religious meetings only in a non-
participatory capacity.137 This last provision singles out religious meet-
ings, further reflecting the Act's religious purpose. In addition, section
4071(d) of the Act expressly states that it does not authorize government
to "influence the form or content of any prayer or other religious activ-
ity," or "to require any person to participate in prayer or any religious
activity."' 38 This section, contemplating student-initiated prayers, indi-
cates that the purpose of the Act is to authorize organized prayer meet-
ings in the public high schools nationwide.
Although equal access policies adopted by school boards prior to the
enactment of the Equal Access Act 139 appear to be untainted by religious
purpose if adopted before requests by religious clubs,"4° those school
board policies adopted pursuant to the Act may well be so tainted. In
sum, the general purpose of the Equal Access Act-to bring organized
religious activities into the public schools-is sufficient to render it un-
of religious purpose in the twenty year legislative history of a variety of prayer statutes leading
up to the statute at issue), aff'd No. 83-5890 (3d Cir. Dec. 24, 1985).
132. 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980).
133. 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982). See 130 CONG. REC. S8334, 8336 (daily ed. June 27,
1984) (statement of Sen. Hatfield).
134. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(1) (Supp. 1985).
135. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(5).
136. Id.
137. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(3).
138. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(d)(l)-(2).
139. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Bender v. Williamsport Area
School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984).
140. See, e.g., Bell v. Little Axe Indep. School Dist., 766 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1985); Lub-
bock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038, 1039 (5th Cir.
1982).
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constitutional under the Establishment Clause. 141
b. Effect-Unconstitutional Advancement of Religion
L Student Initiation and "Equality" of Access
The second prong of the Lemon establishment test proscribes any
government sponsorship of activities and policies that have the effect of
advancing religion, regardless of the government's otherwise secular in-
tent. 142 Notwithstanding the neutral language of the Equal Access Act,
which provides an equal benefit to all extracurricular activities, 43 bene-
fits accruing to religious activities violate this second prong of the Lemon
establishment test."4 Even if the benefit to religion were "merely sym-
bolic," this nonetheless would raise establishment concerns. 14-1 Cer-
tainly, religion receives more than a mere symbolic benefit from
organized group prayers and Bible reading held in the public school
premises during the school day. 146
The claim that equal access carries no unconstitutional effect of ad-
vancing religion rests essentially on two arguments: first, equal access
activities are student-initiated and hence not school sponsored, therefore
there can be no government effect of advancing religion; and, second,
even if equal access does involve a government sponsorship of religion,
this sponsorship is not unconstitutional because the sponsorship extends
to all activities, religious, and nonreligious alike. This equality, it is ar-
gued, "diffuses" the sponsorship, which under the Constitution is barred
only as to religion.
141. Since 1948, this objective has been deemed unconstitutional. In McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948), the Supreme Court considered a voluntary religious instruction
program which offered study of all faiths in the public schools. The Court held that because
the program's purpose was state aid to religion, it was unconstitutional, and to strike it "does
not... manifest a governmental hostility to religion or religious teachings." Id. at 211. For
almost forty years since that decision, the Supreme Court has steadfastly found that prayer or
Bible instruction in the public schools reflects a religious purpose and thus violates the Estab-
lishment Clause. E.g., Abington, 374 U.S. at 222-23; Engel, 320 U.S. at 430-31.
Most recently, in Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985), and Stone v. Graham, 449
U.S. 39 (1980), the Court found the state's religious purpose authorizing silent prayer, and in
providing for the posting of the Ten Commandments on public school walls was enough to
render it constitutionally impermissible.
142. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
143. See supra notes 5 & 18.
144. See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783-85 n.39 (1973) (policy
with any direct and immediate effect of advancing religion is impermissible even though its
primary effect is nonsecular).
145. See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1982).
146. See, e.g., Abington, 374 U.S. at 223-24.
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The equal access argument characterizing prayer activities as
originating voluntarily with students and n9t with the state was rejected
by the Court in Widmar.147 Widmar is consistent with previous deci-
sions holding that private initiation or voluntariness fails to vitiate the
establishment problems inherent in conducting organized religious activi-
ties in school at times associated with the school day. Voluntary student
attendance at religious instruction classes geared to all faiths conducted
at outsider initiative, 148 voluntary reading of Bible verses by students,
149
and voluntary student-initiated prayer at the beginning of the school
day' have all been held to be unconstitutional advancements of religion
in the public schools. These Court decisions establish the irrelevance of
voluntary student participation or initiation to the constitutional issue. 51
To argue otherwise, as do proponents of equal access, is to argue
that the establishment bar is "limited to precluding the State itself from
conducting religious exercises."' 5 2 However, the Supreme Court de-
clared in Abington that establishment concerns bar the state from "em-
ploy[ing] its facilities or funds in a way that gives any church, or all
churches, greater strength in our society than it would have by relying on
its members alone."' 53 This principle is threatened when the state autho-
rizes the use of its schools and attendance requirements for religious
clubs.
The other equal access premise-that the religious advancement ef-
fect of a government policy is in some way cured by an equal grant of
government benefits to religious and nonreligious clubs- is also uncon-
vincing.' 54 Although arguably the Court in Lynch v. Donnelly55 has
147. 454 U.S. at 274. See supra text accompanying notes 5 & 19.
148. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
149. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
150. Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd, 455 U.S. 913 (1982).
151. Four courts of appeals-in Brandon, Lubbock Bender, and Nartowicz-have found
that student-initiated prayer activities in the high schools, despite their voluntariness, involve
unconstitutional state sponsorship. The Fifth Circuit in Little Axe found similar unconstitu-
tional sponsorship at the elementary school level.
152. Abington, 374 U.S. at 229.
153. Id.
154. See supra notes 5 & 18. The equality argument is best set forth in Mueller v. Allen,
463 U.S. 388, 399 (1983) (allowing tuition tax deductions ostensibly equally to parents of pub-
lic school and private school children, notwithstanding that substantial education costs are
incurred only by parents of parochial school children) ("As Widmar and our other decisions
indicate, a program.., that neutrally provides state assistance to a broad spectrum of citizens
is not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause." Id.). Yet, the limits of the
argument are clear. That religion must be treated differently where government sponsorship is
at issue is often conceded by equal access proponents. In Bender, the student club volunteered
to withdraw their request for a faculty "advisor" if necessary to avoid excessive entanglement.
563 F. Supp. at 713-14. Similarly, the Equal Access Act has many limits on sponsorship of all
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breathed some life into this "equality" argument, the establishment viola-
tions would appear to be cured by "equality" only under limited circum-
stances, all involving low government sponsorship-for example, where a
public forum such as the Court found in Widmar gives rise to equal pro-
tection principles mandating religious and nonreligious activities be
treated "equally." 1 56 However, as is proposed below, the public schools
are not public forums; thus this equality mandate is inapplicable.
157
Another instance in which equality may cure an establishment vio-
lation occurs in the parochial aid cases. In Mueller v. Allen, 158 which
involved a tax deduction for all education expenses including parochial
school tuition, the "indirect" nature of the aid reduces the "imprimatur"
of government approval of religion and results in a weaker establishment
claim. "'59 Insofar as the parochial aid cases and those involving a public
forum require only a low level of express government involvement in reli-
gious activities, they are distinguishable from equal access activities or-
ganized in the public schools.
The Court has justified government assistance to religion on "equal-
ity" grounds in only a few other circumstances: First, when it could be
argued that to treat religion differently would require more government
involvement in religion than "equal" benefits would require; 60 and sec-
ond, when there is no alternative to the government support to religion.
This may occur when the state has a traditional monopoly, such as for
fire or police protection,16 ' or when the state has a temporary monopoly,
such as in an emergency, like the sudden destruction of a religious edi-
fice, requiring the temporary use of state premises.1 62
Equal access programs involve none of these circumstances. 63
Thus, neither the origins of a religious activity nor equality of access are
focal to the establishment test effect inquiry. Instead, the two factors
non-curricular clubs because such limits are constitutionally required as to religious clubs. See
supra text accompanying notes 134-37.
155. 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1362-63 (1984) (activity need only have some secular purpose; clearly
secular purpose not required to pass establishment test).
156. See, e.g., Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274; Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Saia
v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (public parks).
157. For discussion see infra text accompanying notes 297-324.
158. 463 U.S. 388 (1983). See also supra note 18.
159. Id. at 397 (citing Widmar 454 U.S. 263).
160. See, eg., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664-74 (1970) (holding churches to be tax
exempt). See also Widmar, 454 U.S. at 272 n. 11.
161. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274-75 (citing Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S.
736, 747 (1976) (plurality opinion) (quoted in Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S.
646, 658 n.6 (1980)).
162. See Abington, 374 U.S. at 299 (Brennan, J., concurring).
163. See infra text accompanying notes 330-32.
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relevant to the effect inquiry are the nature and extent of the government
benefit and the government "imprimatur" or stamp of approval given to
religion. 64
ii. Direct Benefit to Religion
The organizing of religious activities on public school premises at
times associated with the school day provides substantial government aid
to religion in violation of basic separation principles. An establishment
violation lies in the expenditure of tax-raised public funds to support or
promote religious activities in the public schools.'6 5 Similarly, a viola-
tion occurs when tax-raised funds go directly to religious schools.166 The
extension of aid on a nonpreferential basis to all religions does not miti-
gate its unconstitutionality: "Separation is a requirement to abstain from
fusing functions of government and of religious sects, not merely to treat
them all equally."' 6 7 Nor is it mitigated by the extension of aid to secu-
lar activities,'68 although the Court has indicated that, as an evidentiary
matter, aid extended only to religious activities presents a clearer estab-
lishment case. 169
Government confers a number of benefits on religion when religious
meetings are organized in the public schools: the provision of the free
use of tax-financed classrooms, heat and light, free monitoring by teach-
ers or government authorities, and the use of state compulsory attend-
ance laws to gather an audience all combine to promote religious practice
and education. In considering the constitutionality of outside religious
164. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). In Widmar,
these two measures of government sponsorship-benefit and imprimatur-were deemed "inci-
dental" because the Court found that the public forum nature of the university and its existing
student group policy reflected a low level of government sponsorship. 454 U.S. at 274.
165. See Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3221-22; Abington, 374 U.S. at 229 (Douglas, J.,
concurring); McCollum, 333 U.S. at 210 ("[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions").
166. E.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See Witters v. Washington, 54
U.S.L.W. 4135, No. 84-1070 (Jan. 27, 1986).
167. McCollum, 333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (disallowing multi-
denominational religious instructors from teaching on public school premises). See Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 16.
168. See supra notes 154-64.
169. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 272 n. 10; Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir.
1980). The extension of aid to secular activities mitigates the establishment violation only in
certain circumstances, such as those involving a public forum. See, e.g., Widmar, 454 U.S. at
272 n.10 (distinguishing university forum from public school in McCollum). See discussion
supra notes 154-62 and infra text accompanying notes 271-73. See also Scarsdale v. McCreary,
105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985), aff'gper curiam, McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716, 727 (2d Cir. 1984)
("Boniface Circle is available to a broad range of nonreligious and religious organizations,
groups and persons" (emphasis in original)).
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instructors coming into the public schools to teach, the Court in McCol-
lum held that use of rent-free classrooms, together with the benefit de-
rived from the state compulsory attendance laws, constituted an
unconstitutional establishment.17 ° The attendance laws provided the
benefit of gathering a student audience for proselytizing purposes. 17 1 In
Abington School District v. Schempp, the Court reaffirmed the McCollum
holding and recognized the additional benefit posed by free teacher su-
pervision of religious activities. 172
The Equal Access Act, by allowing religious clubs to meet on class-
room public school premises, under teacher supervision and at times as-
sociated with the school day, extends to school religious clubs that
government aid deemed to be impermissible in McCollum and Abington,
including classroom space, heat and light, 173 free teacher monitoring,"
and the benefit of state compulsory school attendance laws.17 5
170. 333 U.S. 203, 209-10 (1948).
171. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 439 (Douglas, J., concurring) (characterizing McCollum as
involving use of the school for proselytizing).
172. 374 U.S. at 223.
173. See generally 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071(a), (b), (c)(3) (Supp. 1985). Sections 4071(a) and
4071(d)(3) provide that the equal access meetings may take place on the premises of public
secondary schools and that the "incidental costs" incurred in providing the space are author-
ized. This use of the tax paid premises has been held to be an unconstitutional aid to religion
in several cases. E.g., Abington, 374 U.S. at 223; McCollum, 333 U.S. at 210. See also Trietley
v. Board of Educ., 65 A.D.2d 1, 409 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1978) (if clubs were to meet, state financial
support would flow directly to the club in the form of rent-free classroom space and facilities,
heat, lighting, and connected expenses); Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School
Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1977) (rent-free classroom space, heat and light,
and teacher monitoring is impermissible).
174. Who shall pay for teacher supervision is a question not specifically addressed in the
Act. Although the Act expressly allows expenditure of public funds only for the "incidental
costs" in the use of school premises, 20 U.S.C. § 4071(d)(3), there is no provision for non-
school payment of teacher supervision time. If volunteered supervision time is contemplated,
this demands a motivation in teachers which could result in unconstitutional participation in
the religion clubs. For cases addressing the issue of teacher supervision, see Bell v. Little Axe
Indep. School Dist., 766 F.2d 1391, 1404-05 (1985) (holding unconstitutional benefit in state
sponsored teacher monitors) ("[Tihe mere appearance of a joint exercise of ... authority by
church and state provides a significant symbolic benefit to religion."); Johnson, 68 Cal. App. 3d
at 12, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 41; see also Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1982).
Equal access cases involving teacher supervision have generally held supervision to be uncon-
stitutional, not on benefit grounds, but because of the appearance of government imprimatur
or endorsement resulting from use of school faculty advisors. See, e.g., LittleAxe, 766 F.2d at
1405 ("We believe that the presence of even one teacher would produce the same aura of
school authorization and approval."); Bender, 741 F.2d at 552-53; Nartowicz, 736 F.2d at 648;
Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1046 (also discussing the benefit afforded by compulsory attendance
laws).
175. The Act provides that equal access clubs must meet during "noninstructional time."
20 U.S.C. § 4071(b). "Noninstructional time" is defined as time "before actual classroom in-
struction begins or after actual classroom instruction ends." 20 U.S.C. § 4072(4). Whether
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Whether equal access would be similarly unconstitutional if re-
stricted to times not contiguous with the public school day-and thus not
benefitting from state attendance laws-is unclear. At issue is whether
the financial benefit attendant to the rent-free use of the public school
premises is itself sufficient to render government aid to religion unconsti-
tutional. In McCollum, unconstitutional benefit derived from both the
rent-free use of the school premises and the compulsory attendance ma-
chinery. 76 In Widmar, on the other hand, no state law compelled uni-
versity classroom attendance and the Court permitted the equal access
club the use of the classrooms. Other nonclassroom costs related to stu-
dent clubs were borne not by taxpayers but rather were paid for out of
student fees. 177
The chief distinction appears to be the purpose and function of the
forum.' 78 In Widmar, where the government property at issue was a
public forum, the benefit derived from its use was held to be per se inci-
dental.1 79 In contrast, as concerns the public schools, which are not pub-
lic forums, the rent-free use of the premises may be enough to constitute
unconstitutional government aid.' 80 Thus, although the Court has not
yet ruled on this point, even weekend use of the public schools on a rent-
free or artificially low rent basis may afford an unconstitutional benefit to
religion.18 1
In addition to the use of public school property, the use of school
media, including the school's loudspeaker, newspaper, and bulletin
this is intended to include activity periods during the day is unclear. Nevertheless, under any
interpretation a meeting may occur just before the school day begins or just after it ends-thus
permitting religion to benefit from the compulsory attendance machinery. This benefit was
held unconstitutional in McCollum, 333 U.S. 203, 209-10. See also Bender, 741 F.2d at 552;
Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1046; Brandon, 635 F.2d at 978-79.
176. 333 U.S. at 209-10.
177. 454 U.S. at 274.
178. See infra notes 277-87 and accompanying text.
179. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 273.
180. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., Country Hills Christian Church v. Unified School Dist., 560 F. Supp. 1207
(D. Kan. 1983). See also Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (indicating that govern-
ment funds may not be used to provide or maintain buildings to be used by religious organiza-
tions). See also Stone v. McCreary, 575 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (mere use of public
land, in the absence of a private speaker, constituted unconstitutional government aid to a
privately sponsored creche display), rev'd, 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'd per curiam by an
equally divided Court, 105 S. Ct. 291 (1985). That the compulsory attendance laws alone are
not enough would also seem clear from the Court's decision in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306 (1952) (sustaining a release-time program allowing students to leave from the public
school where they have been collected pursuant to state attendance laws to go to study religion
off the school premises). The Court found the absence of the aid posed by use of public school
classrooms, heat, and light to be dispositive. Id. at 308-09.
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boards, to advertise equal access meetings, indicates unconstitutional
support of religion.182 Whether these benefits would be extended to reli-
gious clubs pursuant to the Equal Access Act remains to be seen. The
extent of permissible school sponsorship under the Act is addressed by
two provisions. One bars the "promotion" of meetings.183 The other
authorizes the use of public funds only for the "incidental cost of provid-
ing the space for student-initiated meetings."' 84
Funding, other than for classrooms, such as for school publications,
bulletin boards, photocopy machines, public address systems, and year-
books, is not authorized by the Act, although it is not expressly
barred.'85 If it is not barred by the Act, this use of school media and
funding also raises entanglement problems. 86 Moreover, if this funding
is barred, it must be withheld uniformly pursuant to the Act's mandate
against content discrimination.' 87 However, even when these benefits are
equally accorded to all clubs-not just to those that are religious, the
Establishment Clause would only bar government aid to religion.'88 The
result must be either an excessive government entanglement to monitor
this disparate treatment of religious equal access clubs,' 89 which itself
would violate the Equal Access Act's requirement of equal treatment, 190
or a withholding of all of these benefits from secular and nonsecular
groups alike.
Thus, if a variety of noncurricular clubs are accorded access pursu-
ant to the Act, arguably only the religious club is benefitted in that the
Act increases the access for religious clubs while diminishing the access
for nonreligious clubs. This "equal treatment" results in a loss to all
nonreligious clubs and a benefit only to the religious club, indicated in
Widmar to be evidence of an establishment clause violation.' 9 1
182. See, e.g., Bender, 741 F.2d at 556 (promise not to use school advertisement media
insufficient because school enforcement of that promise would constitute excessive entangle-
ment); Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1039 (use of public address system for morning prayer and Bible
readings); Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 13, 137
Cal. Rptr. 43, 50 (1977). See also Little Axe, 766 F.2d at 1406 (ruling use of posters to be
unconstitutional as excessive entanglement).
183. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071(c)(2), 4072(2) (Supp. 1985).
184. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(d)(3).
185. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071(c)(2), 4072(2).
186. See, e.g., Bell v. Little Axe, 766 F.2d at 1404-05; Nartowicz, 736 F.2d at 649-50.
187. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a).
188. See supra text accompanying note 154.
189. See infra notes 244-73 and accompanying text.
190. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a).
191. 454 U.S. at 271 n.10.
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ii. Imprimatur: Government Sponsorship and
the Appearance of Sponsorship
The Establishment Clause bars not only government benefit to reli-
gion in the tangible forms discussed above, but also bars "imprimatur,"
or government endorsement or the appearance of an endorsement which
will unconstitutionally advance religion. The Supreme Court in Widmar
and five court of appeals cases considering the constitutionality of equal
access policies have emphasized the importance of the imprimatur in-
quiry.'92 The inquiry is twofold. It measures objective indicia of govern-
ment approval of a religious activity;193 and it encompasses a subjective
component-the perception of government endorsement.1 94
A strong presumption of imprimatur or government endorsement
arises when equal access clubs are organized in public high schools. 9 '
Both the objective factors, resulting from government control in the pub-
lic schools, 196 and the subjective factors, the youth and impressionability
of school children,197 distinguish the consideration of equal access poli-
cies in the public high schools from that in a university.1 98
Numerous objective factors constitute government endorsement
when equal access clubs are organized in the schools: school approval of
192. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274; Little Axe, 766 F.2d at 1405; Bender, 741 F.2d at 551-
57; Nartowic, 736 F.2d at 649-50; Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1045-46; Brandon, 635 F.2d at 978-
79. The importance of imprimatur inquiry to the establishment analysis goes beyond the equal
access cases. In Lynch v. Donnelly, Justice O'Connor proposed an establishment test alterna-
tive to Lemon, which reduced Lemon to only the purpose plus imprimatur inquiry. Lynch,
104 S. Ct. at 1368 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105
S. Ct. 3216 (majority opinion appears to adopt O'Connor formulation). Recent parochial aid
cases have sustained financial government benefit to religion in the absence of imprimatur.
See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
193. Engel, 370 U.S. at 429 ("[O]ne of the greatest dangers to the freedom of the individual
to worship in his own way lay in, the Government's placing its official stamp of approval upon
one particular kind of prayer.").
194. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274 and n.14; Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736,
750-54 (1976); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216 (1963).
195. See infra text accompanying notes 199-213.
196. See infra text accompanying notes 199-213. See also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,
431 (1962) ("prestige and financial support of government" results in "indirect coercive pres-
sure on religious minorities to conform").
197. See infra text accompanying notes 225-36.
198. Compare Bender, 741 F.2d at 552-53; Nartowicz 736 F.2d at 649; Lubbock 669 F.2d
at 1045-46 and Brandon, 635 F.2d at 978-79 with Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274 n.14. Commenta-
tors choosing to rely on one aspect, such as the youth and impressionability of high school
students, deliberately gloss over the many elements of state involvement present in a high
school, discussed infra text accompanying notes 199-213, but absent in a university, such as
the compulsory attendance laws and teacher supervision. See Note, supra note 19, 92 YALE
L.J. 499, 502 (1983) (describing the decisions barring student-initiated clubs in high schools as
resting "in large part on the assumption that high school students are impressionable and
immature").
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the club, allotment of club time during the school day, the benefit of state
compulsory attendance, teacher supervision of the clubs, and use of
school media.
When religious clubs are recognized pursuant to equal access school
policies, this recognition may constitute unconstitutional government ap-
proval. 199 When this approval is accorded to only one religious noncur-
ricular club, which is permissible under the Equal Access Act2°° and as
was the case in Bender v. Williamsport Area School District,201 the likeli-
hood of unconstitutionality is even greater.2 "2 Approval of the one reli-
gious club gives an unconstitutional stamp of government
sponsorship. 203 This imprimatur or official approval is magnified when
the one religious club is large. 2"
In addition to school recognition of religious clubs, allowing these
equal access clubs meeting times contiguous with the school day, as with
the Regents' prayer in Engel, has been held to be a central factor creating
the appearance of school approval or endorsement of the clubs.2" 5 The
timing of these meetings is deemed to coincide with the government
sponsored school day, whether the equal access club is organized before,
during, or after the school day.2 ° 6
199. E.g., Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (1984). In the Wil-
liamsport School District, all equal access clubs had to be approved by the school board. The
importance of this school sanction was emphasized by an opinion of the Maryland Attorney
General which specified that the only equal access policy that would pass constitutional muster
is one involving no school recognition of the clubs or school classroom assignment for the
clubs. See 69 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 84-031 (1984); Note, supra note 19, 50 U. CIN. L. REv. 740
(1981). "It would seem that a public school treads close to the precipice of unconstitutionality
by announcing sponsorship of student groups when such groups include religious ones." Id. at
770 n.173.
200. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(b) provides that a limited forum exists "whenever such school grants
an offering... for one or more noncurriculum-related student groups to meet."
201. 741 F.2d at 543 n.8 (although there were other clubs, none was political, ideological,
or religious like Petros).
202. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271-72. The number of clubs is an evidentiary factor important
in assessing both the existence of government imprimatur and whether there is a public forum.
Given its evidentiary significance, it would seem that actual diversity and not merely hypothet-
ical or potential variety is a predicate for both the establishment and public forum inquiry. See
hfra text accompanying notes 285-290. But see Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274; McCreary, 739 F.2d
at 727 ("no doubt that Boniface Circle is available to a broad range of Scarsdale's nonreligious
and religious organizations" (emphasis in original)).
203. See, e.g., Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980). See Widmar, 454
U.S. 263, 271 n.10.
204. See Clark, Comments on Some Policies Underlying the Constitutional Law of Religious
Freedom, 64 MINN. L. REV. 453 (1980).
205. See, e.g., Bender, 741 F.2d at 553; Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1046; Brandon, 635 F.2d at
979.
206. Compare Bender, 741 F.2d at 553 (clubs meet during the student activity period dur-
ing the school day) with Little Axe, 766 F.2d at 1405 (clubs met in the morning "during the
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The use of compulsory attendance laws is an additional factor con-
tributing to government imprimatur. As held by the Court in Abington
and Engel, these laws, by forcing students to come to school, create the
appearance of a state-sponsored captive audience for the religious activi-
ties.2°7 In this regard, the Bender court distinguished the public high
school from the university in Widmar:
Unlike universities, attendance for most high school students is
made compulsory by state law. Moreover, high school instruction
is given in a structured and controlled environment and in more
confined facilities than is usual in the open, free and more fluid
environment of a college campus. Thus, the possible perception by
adolescent students that government is communicating an endorse-
ment of religion if it permitted a religious group to meet would be
vastly different in a high school setting than the perception of such
action by college students in a college setting.2 °8
In addition to the use of the school day and the compulsory attend-
ance laws, the use of teacher supervision to monitor the clubs further
reflects government imprimatur. Equal access contemplates "exercises
... held in the school buildings under the supervision ... of teachers
employed in those schools, ' 20 9 a practice stricken in Abington.210 Little
Axe, Bender, Nartowicz, Lubbock, and Brandon all considered the issue
whether faculty monitoring constitutes state approval of the religious ac-
school day" although prior to the commencement of classes); Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1045
(clubs meeting before buses arrive and after the buses run deemed to occur "at a time closely
associated with the beginning or end of the school day") and Brandon, 635 F.2d at 979
("[O]fficial school day 'begins' when buses discharge students. Thus, any voluntary student
prayer meetings conducted after the arrival of the school buses and before the formal 'home-
room' period ... would occur during school hours").
207. See Abington, 374 U.S. at 223; Engel, 370 U.S. at 442 ("captive audience"); Bender,
741 F.2d at 553; Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1046; Brandon, 635 F.2d at 978; Johnson, 68 Cal. App.
3d at 13, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 49-50. The organizing of clubs at times associated with the compul-
sory school day undermines the volunteerism of the clubs. See supra text accompanying notes
125-28; infra notes 316-23.
The only possible distinction concerning timing for purposes of the establishment clause
analysis is if the religious activities occur on the school premises when the school is not func-
tioning as a school and is a forum open to the public under state law. E.g., OKLA. STAT. tit.
70, § 5-130 (1981). At that time, the compulsory education machinery is not in operation.
There are no students or teachers necessarily on the school premises. See Country Hills Chris-
tian Church v. Unified School Dist., 560 F. Supp. 1207 (D. Kan. 1983); Resnick v. East Bruns-
wick Township Bd. of Educ., 77 N.J. 88, 389 A.2d 944 (1978) (allowing school building to be
used at night as temporary facility by religious organizations under a program that grants
access to all charitable groups).
208. Bender, 741 F.2d at 552.
209. Abington, 374 U.S. at 223.
210. Id.
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tivities.2 11 In considering the importance of teacher monitoring-re-
quired by state law in high schools but not universities-the Bender
court again distinguished Widmar:
[I]t is readily apparent that a school teacher or someone associated
with the school necessarily must impart the impression to students
that the school's authority and the school's endorsement is impli-
cated in the relevant activity, since every monitor must be ap-
proved by the school. Even a parent undertaking the role of
monitor would necessarily be perceived as a school authority. It
goes without saying that no such authority figure or government
endorsement was part of the Widmar activity program, undoubt-
edly because of the age and maturity difference of the students.212
Other objective imprimatur factors include the use of school media to
announce and report on religious activities.213
Several of these factors creating imprimatur are present in the equal
access policy authorized by the Equal Access Act. School approval or
endorsement is contemplated by the Act, which provides that equal ac-
cess purposes are triggered when the school approves one or more
noncurriculum related clubs.214 The Act also provides that clubs are to
211. See Little Axe, 766 F.2d at 1405; Bender, 741 F.2d at 552; Nartowicz, 736 F.2d at 648;
Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1047; Brandon, 635 F.2d at 978.
212. Bender, 741 F.2d at 552-53.
213. See, eg., id. at 556 (loudspeaker); Nartowicz, 736 F.2d at 649 (public address system
and bulletin boards); Lubbock 669 F.2d at 1039 (loudspeaker); Johnson v. Huntington Beach
Unified School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 13, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43, 50 (school newspaper and
bulletin board). See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 183 (1972) (considering an SDS club
on a university campus, the Court found that lack of access to university media is a substantial
impediment to a nonrecognized club).
In the Lubbock School District, just as in Clayton County in the Nartowicz case, the
school used the public address system to announce the prayer meetings. Lubbock, 669 F.2d at
1039. In Little Axe, the equal access policies specifically provided for student use of student
bulletin boards, posters, public address systems, and school funds for religious clubs. 766 F.2d
at 1406. Since the enactment of the Equal Access Act, the Hicksville School District, Long
Island, N.Y., has used the school's loudspeaker to announce equal access club meetings. Also,
teachers organizing equal access meetings for themselves sought access to the school newspa-
per in Mary May v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp., 615 F. Supp. 761 (S.D. Ind. 1985).
Interestingly, these aspects of state sponsorship are conceded to be unconstitutional establish-
ments by proponents of equal access. Thus Petros, the student religious group in Bender, in its
request for school board approval, voluntarily relinquished demands for other school sponsor-
ship, such as the use of the bulletin board or yearbook. In so doing, these students arguably
conceded that worship clubs in the school are different from other noncurricular activities and
should be governed by different standards.
214. See 20 U.S.C. § 4071(b), which provides that it is the school which "grants an offering
to the opportunity for one or more noncurriculum related student groups to meet." Implicit in
the terms of the Act is a process whereby a request for a club must be initiated by a student
and presented to the school principal or school board. This interpretation of the Act was made
by at least one state Attorney General. 69 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 84-031 (Dec. 6, 1984). The
Maryland policy provides that students may have clubs on school premises as long as they do
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meet on school premises during "non-instructional time." This is defined
to mean "time set aside by the school before actual classroom instruction
begins or after classroom instruction ends." '215 This definition gives rise
to two conflicting interpretations. One is that the meetings are to occur
before the first classroom instruction begins and after the last one ends,
i.e., before and after the school day. The second is that the equal access
meetings are authorized before or after any classroom instruction period,
i.e., during free periods as they occur throughout the day such as lunch
or student activity periods.
The first interpretation has the most support in the legislative his-
tory.216 However, even under this interpretation of the Act, which
would schedule all meetings before and after the school day, the meetings
would still fall under the timing and compulsory attendance considera-
tions deemed relevant in the Little Axe, Nartowicz, Lubbock, and Bran-
don cases, in which the Courts of Appeals for the Tenth, Eleventh, Fifth,
and Second Circuits barred student prayer clubs occurring before and
after the school day.217
The Equal Access Act allows the teacher monitoring of student
prayer clubs for the custodial purposes required by state law. This moni-
toring function was deemed unconstitutional by the Court in Abington218
not inform the school-thus limiting school acknowledgment or imprimatur on the religious
activity. Id.
215. 20 U.S.C. § 4072(4).
216. See 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2348: One of the "significant differences
between S. 1059 and Title VIII" is that "S. 1059 deals with extracurricular activities during
school hours while Title VIII deals with extracurricular activities before and after school hours
.... " Much of the discussion in the congressional debates supports this view. See 130 CONG.
REC. S8353 (daily ed. June 27, 1984). According to Senator Hatfield, "Regular instructional
period is what the school would have when class is first scheduled in the morning ... and it
ends at 3:30." Sen. Jud. Comm. EqualAccess Hearings, supra note 5, at 13. This definition of
"instructional period," rejects the legislative history of predecessor bills, which expressly au-
thorized meetings during noninstructional time during the school day. See id. ("[n]on-instruc-
tional periods might include recess, lunchtime, study hall, club period, or any other time when
a public school allows student clubs or groups to meet") (statement of Sen. Mark Hatfield).
See also Religious Speech Protection Act Hearings, supra note 11, at 6. A problem with the
"school-day" interpretation is that it would not provide a uniform time for meetings, because
secondary school students have different schedules. Thus, it is difficult to understand if the
noninstructional period is deemed to occur after all the students' classes are over or after an
individual student's classes are over. Further, if what legislators meant was before or after the
school "day," why did they use the term "classroom instruction"? See 130 CONG. REc. S8356
(daily ed. June 27, 1984) (Sen. Denton's "activity period" interpretation).
217. See Little Axe, 766 F.2d at 1406 (holding unconstitutional before-class prayers and
considering them to take place "during the school day"); Nartowicz, 736 F.2d at 648; Lubbock
669 F.2d at 1046-47; Brandon, 635 F.2d at 978-79. See supra notes 206-07.
218. 374 U.S. at 225.
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and by five courts of appeals.2 19 Moreover, the Act permits potentially
greater teacher involvement because it contemplates monitoring for other
purposes. Under the Act, a school is authorized to allow its employees
or agents to supervise all meetings, religious and nonreligious alike, as
long as such supervision is for "custodial purposes,"22 and is "nonpar-
ticipatory" as to religious meetings.221 However, in apparent tension
with the statute's bar on teacher participation, permissible supervision
under the Act extends to maintaining order, protecting the well-being of
students and faculty, and to assuring that attendance of students at meet-
ings is voluntary.222 Indeed, such supervision may even be implicitly re-
quired. The Act requires that equal access meetings be "voluntary and
student-initiated," 223 and it also requires that "non-school persons may
not direct, conduct, control or regularly attend activities of student
groups. 224 Assuring compliance with these provisions would seem to
require school employees to supervise the meetings more extensively than
the mere custodial supervision required by state law.
iv. Subjective Imprimatur
Central to the presumption of sponsorship in the public schools is
the youth and impressionability of school children. This subjective factor
compounds the objective government sponsorship to create an even
greater appearance of government endorsement of religious activities or-
ganized in the public schools.
The Supreme Court has discussed this perception of government
sponsorship in its decisions striking religious activities in the public
schools, 225 and in its decisions sustaining organized prayer in other fo-
219. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
220. 20 U.S.C. § 4072(2).
221. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(3). The Act expressly bars participation of teachers in prayer
meetings, although this bar would appear to be inconsistent with the "free speech theory" of
equal access prayer. See supra notes 5 & 9. If the Act does create a public forum in the school,
it follows that both students and teachers should be able to avail themselves of their free speech
rights. See Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 505, 506 (1969) (holding first amendment speech
rights available on public school campus to teachers and students). The issue of teacher partic-
ipation was recently addressed by a court when a group of teachers challenged the constitu-
tionality of the Equal Access Act's bar on their participation in equal access prayer clubs.
Mary May v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp., 615 F. Supp. 761 (S.D. Ind. 1985).
222. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(f). This tension is increased by the Act's requirement that teachers
volunteer for supervision of the clubs, 20 U.S.C. § 4071(d)(4), since teachers who volunteer
would likely be supportive of the particular club such that their supervision would effectively
involve participation in the religious club.
223. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(1).
224. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(5).
225. See Abington, 374 U.S. 203; Engel, 370 U.S. 421; McCollum, 333 U.S. 203.
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rums.
22 6  The Court held in Widmar that a university equal access pol-
icy "does not confer any imprimatur of State approval on religious sects
or practices. ' 227 In the university, the absence of imprimatur of state
approval is due to both the absence of objective imprimatur indicia, such
as university recognition of the clubs, state compulsory attendance, and
teacher supervision, and to the absence of what might be termed "subjec-
tive imprimatur."228 Subjective imprimatur is missing because university
students are "young adults" and therefore "less impressionable" than
younger students, who might view the extent of state action or sponsor-
ship as approval.229
The distinction drawn in Widmar between university and younger
students is the ability of older students to discern government neutrality
versus endorsement of organized religious activities.23 School religion
case law consistently has drawn this bright line and required stricter es-
tablishment scrutiny for government sponsorship of religious activities in
the public schools than in forums where only adults are present.23 1 The
minor age of school children operates as a presumptive factor to com-
pound the effect of government aid to religion in the public schools. 232
The importance of the youth and impressionability of children is
emphasized in the many federal district and appellate decisions striking
equal access policies in the public high schools. 233 The central question
is "to what extent does the impressionability of students affect their per-
226. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding prayer in a state legisla-
ture); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274 (upholding prayer in a public university).
227. 454 U.S. at 274.
228. See id. at 274 n.14. Cf Bender, 741 F.2d at 552-53.
229. 454 U.S. at 374 n.14.
230. Id.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 225-26. See also Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672, 685-86 (1971). The bright line's special government solicitude for children under eighteen
as opposed to young adults, is evidenced in many other areas of civil rights where government
protection or solicitude of children extends to those under age eighteen because of legislative
and judicial presumptions relating to the impressionability and lack of capacity of youth. This
presumption of youth and impressionability is evidenced by various examples of assertions of
state parens patriae power against children and adolescents. Some examples are the compul-
sory education laws, child labor laws, curfew laws, and laws restricting marriage and voting
rights. See, e.g., Moe v. Dinkins, 669 F.2d 67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 827 (1982) (no
fundamental right to marry for minors). See generally M. GUGGENHEIM & A. SUSSMAN, THE
RIGHTS OF YOUNG PEOPLE 247-64 (1985).
232. See supra notes 225-29 and accompanying text.
233. See, e.g., Bender, 741 F.2d at 554; Nartowicz, 736 F.2d at 649; Lubbock 669 F.2d at
1045-46; Brandon, 635 F.2d at 978. See also Little Axe, 766 F.2d at 1404 ("Elementary School
children are vastly more impressionable than high school or university students and cannot be
expected to discern nuances which indicate whether there is true neutrality toward religion on
the part of a school administrator.").
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ceptions of the school's actions. '23 4 Bender, Lubbock and Brandon held
that the impressionability of the young prevents them from appreciating
that a school may allow access by a student religious group, not out of
any intent to advance religion, but rather as a part of a policy of neutral-
ity toward religion or for a secular expressive purpose.2 35 As the court in
Brandon declared:
Our nation's elementary and secondary schools play a unique role
in transmitting basic and fundamental values to our youth. To an
impressionable student, even the mere appearance of secular in-
volvement in religious activities might indicate that the state has
placed its imprimatur on a particular religious creed. This sym-
bolic inference is too dangerous to permit.
236
The subjective imprimatur component of the presumption in the
schools is particularly relevant to the constitutional issue posed by the
Equal Access Act. Despite the Act's free speech thesis of nondiscrimina-
tion regarding religion, and its intent to treat equally religious and non-
religious activity, the Act may well be regarded by students as seeking to
endorse or facilitate religion clubs. 237 This in part may be attributable to
the Act's legislative origin in school prayer bills. 3 Moreover, the objec-
tive imprimatur factors operative in the Act are compounded by the
youth and impressionability of students covered by the Act.2 39 This is
particularly the case in those states where the Acts scope will extend
beyond high school to junior high stddents. AlXhougii the Equal Access
Act's authority expressly extends to "secondary school" students only,24°
"secondary school" is reserved for definition by state law.241 Many state
234. This impressionability of secondary school children was reaffirmed in Lubbock:
"[T]he impressionability of secondary and primary school age children and the possibility that
they would misapprehend the involvement of the District in these meetings, renders the pri-
mary effect of the policy impermissible advancement of religion." 669 F.2d at 1045. See
Widmar, 545 U.S. at 274 n.14. But see Note, supra note 19, 92 YALE L.J. 499, 502 (1983).
235. See supra note 233.
236. 635 F.2d at 928.
237. See Bender, 741 F.2d at 552.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62. Students "mature" enough to read the
newpaper will learn that the purpose of the Act is to introduce prayer into schools. The Wash-
ington Post, on May 14, 1984, referred to the Equal Access legislation, declaring, "in Congress
they're calling it Son of School Prayer." President Signs a Bill to Permit Prayer in Schools,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1984, at A24, col. 1.
239. The youth and impressionability of students exposed to equal access clubs under the
Act was testified to repeatedly. See, e.g., Religious Speech Protection Act Hearings, supra note
11, at 112-13 (statement of Ruti Teitel, Ass't Dir., Legal Affairs, Anti-Defamation League); id.
at 79 (statement of Barry Lynn, Legislative Counsel, ACLU). This characterization of high
school students, however, was not generally accepted by congressional committees considering
the issue. See S. REP. No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1984).
240. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a).
241. 20 U.S.C. § 4072(1).
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laws define "secondary school" to include junior high students,242 who
may be eleven and twelve years old and thus presumed even more im-
pressionable. The Court has held that children this age view organized
religious exercises in the public schools as state sponsored.243
c. Excessive Entanglement
The third prong of the Lemon test requires an examination of the
extent to which equal access policies cause excessive entanglement of the
schools in religious affairs. 2" Many of the same elements suggesting
state imprimatur also result in excessive entanglement.245 The organiz-
ing of religious activities on school premises during the school day, under
the official supervision of a school monitor, has the effect both of advanc-
ing religion and of creating entanglement by "putting the school in a
position of governance over religious activity. '2 46 But in addition, the
entanglement inquiry also raises questions of a procedural nature as to
whether the policy promotes an ongoing relationship between church
and state.247
Relying on the Court's Lemon standard,248 the courts in Little Axe,
Bender, Lubbock, and Brandon held that when organized prayer activi-
ties occur at times associated with the school day, impermissible entan-
glement results from faculty supervision of the prayer meetings.2 49
Because state laws place the responsibility for students during the day
242. See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2 (McKinney 1969) (defining "secondary school" to
include both junior and senior high school). Presumably, in New York, junior high school
students as young as eleven would be subject to the Act. Legislative history suggests Congress
intended to limit the Act to "high schools" even though the term "secondary school" was
used. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REC. S8347 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (applicable age group de-
scribed as "kids who are freshman through seniors in high schools. It is people who are 14
through 18 years of age.") (statement of Sen. Danforth). Despite confusing legislative history,
the Act very clearly leaves the definition of secondary school to state law.
243. See, e.g., Abington, 374 U.S. at 290 (Brennan, J., concurring), reaff'd in Wallace v.
Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985). See also Little Axe, 766 F.2d at 1404.
244. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271 (citing approvingly to Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612).
245. See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768-69 (1976) (White, J., concur-
ring) (excessive entanglement test is duplicative of secular effect test). See, e.g., Little Axe, 766
F.2d at 1406.
246. Bender, 741 F.2d at 556. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 621-22.
247. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 755. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 621-22; Brandon, 635 F.2d at 979.
248. 403 U.S. at 620-21.
249. Little Axe, 766 F.2d at 1406; Bender, 741 F.2d at 556-57; Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1047;
Brandon, 635 F.2d at 979. See Karen B., 653 F.2d at 902; Collins, 644 F.2d at 762 (excessive
entanglement results from school supervision of prayer at student assemblies); See also
Trietley, 65 A.D.2d at 7, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
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with the school,"' ° supervision of any meeting is required. As the court
in Brandon stated, "if the state must engage in continuing administrative
supervision of nonsecular activity, church and state are excessively inter-
twined.1"2 51  This type of entanglement has been held fatal to prayer
meetings on school premises, even when supervision is by nonschool em-
ployees who are merely approved by the school.2
2
Beyond the entanglement posed by custodial or administrative su-
pervision of equal access meetings is entanglement resulting from super-
vision to maintain voluntariness at the equal access meetings. To ensure
student initiation and the absence of coercion, state employees are put in
a position of ongoing monitoring.253 The Equal Access Act provides for
both types of teacher supervision,254 and clearly contemplates entangle-
ment objections.
On the one hand, the Act requires that the meetings be voluntary
and student-initiated, 255 that outsiders not control the meetings, 256 and
that teachers be nonparticipatory at religious meetings.2 57 On the other
hand, other provisions of the Act seek to protect students from control
by outsiders that exercise strong proselytizing techniques by authorizing
the school to "maintain order and discipline on school premises, to pro-
tect the well-being of students and faculty, and to assure that attendance
of students at meetings is voluntary. '258 Thus, in order to guarantee stu-
dent voluntariness and avoid outsider control, teachers will have to be-
250. In Little Axe, Oklahoma, for example, supervision of prayer meetings was required
because under Oklahoma state law, the state must supervise students during the school day.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 1-1114 (1981).
251. 635 F.2d at 979.
252. Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1047 n.16 (citing McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 208
(1948)). See supra note 249.
253. See, eg., Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1047; Karen B., 653 F.2d at 902; Collins, 644 F.2d at
762; Trietley, 65 A.D.2d at 6-7, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
254. Compare 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071(f) and 4072(2) (custodial supervision) with 20 U.S.C.
§§ 4071(a) (unlawful to discriminate on basis of content of speech at meeting) and 4071(c)(1)
(meetings must be voluntary and student-initiated).
255. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(1).
256. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(5).
257. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(3).
258. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(f). While the voluntariness provisions are essential to equal access
theory, the National Education Association testified repeatedly at equal access legislation hear-
ings that its members cannot supervise for coercion. Religious Speech Protection Act Hearings,
supra note 11, at 42-43 (statement of Linda Tarr-Whelan, Dir. of Gov't Rel., NEA); Sen. Jud.
Comm. EqualAccess Hearings, supra note 5, 201 ("S. 1059... would require school employees
to maintain appropriate discipline at gatherings of religious groups on school property ....
Any meaningful, productive religious discussion among our children requires facilitation, di-
rection setting and supervision. Obviously Congress cannot provide that supervision in the
public school setting.") (statement of Ms. Piccinini, Pres., Maryland Teachers Ass'n, speaking
on behalf of NEA). See also id. at 206-08.
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come involved. This involvement necessarily results in excessive teacher
entanglement and could be avoided only through further school em-
ployee entanglement involving supervision of teachers to insure their
nonparticipation.259
The Act's express bar of teacher participation in religious meetings
and its attendant but apparently unintended bar of teacher participation
in any other nonreligious clubs2 60 indicates the anticipation of entangle-
ment objections. How this bar on participation in meetings coexists with
the Act's provisions for supervision for voluntariness purposes is a diffi-
cult tension which the Act fails to address, but which places the schools
in the unenviable position of violating both constitutional requirements
and the terms of the Act by merely following the Act's supervision
requirements.
In addition to the entanglement resulting from state personnel su-
pervising religion clubs, further entanglement of the state in religion oc-
curs when school funding is used to advance equal access clubs. School
funding would be involved, for example, if special salary costs are ex-
pended for teacher supervision.261 Similar entanglement results from the
use of school media for the clubs2 62 because the school is placed in a
position of continually regulating the use of its resources in order not to
assist religious activities.263 Although the Equal Access Act does not au-
thorize use of school media to advance the clubs, neither are they ex-
pressly barred by the Act. This use may conflict with sections of the Act
that bar school sponsorship. 2" Nevertheless, it is clear that some level of
sponsorship is necessitated by the Act, such as recognition of the clubs,
259. See, e.g., Bender, 741 F.2d at 556. As the Supreme Court held in Lemon, "the very
restrictions and surveillance necessary to ensure that teachers play a strictly nonideological
role give rise to entanglements between church and state." 403 U.S. at 620-21. See also
Trietley, 65 A.D.2d at 7, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 917 ("Without constant supervision, these Bible
clubs readily could become exclusively sectarian classes in religious instruction within the pub-
licly supported school system.").
260. Whether or not the Act permits teachers to participate in nonreligious meetings is
ambiguous. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(3), which bars teacher participation at religious meetings,
suggests that teachers would be permitted to participate in nonreligious meetings. However,
school restrictions on school sponsorship in the Act affect all meetings, religious and nonreli-
gious. According to § 4071(c)(2), there must be "no sponsorship of the meeting by the school,
the government, or its agents or employees .... (emphasis added). Sponsorship, as defined
by the Act, includes "the act of promoting, leading or participating in a meeting." 20 U.S.C.
§ 4072(2) (emphasis added). Thus, this section appears to prohibit faculty participation in all
noncurricular meetings, not just those that are religious.
261. No provision is made in the Act for reimbursing teachers for supervision.
262. See supra note 213. Cf Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (funding provided for
student meetings in university forum).
263. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619; Bender, 741 F.2d at 556.
264. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071(c)(2), 4071(d)(3), and 4072(2).
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the use of classrooms, the provision of light and heat, and possible extra
salary requirements for teacher supervision.z65 Use of school media for
clubs organized pursuant to the Act results in the same entanglement
found in pre-Act equal access clubs' use of school resources to assist wor-
ship activities. 66
Perhaps the most significant entanglement resulting from an equal
access policy is the requirement of the daily school management of the
religious divisiveness produced by the organizing of sectarian religious
meetings on campus. These divisions along religious lines were consid-
ered by the Framers,' and by the Supreme Court, to be exactly what the
Establishment Clause was designed to prevent.267 This divisiveness is of
special concern in the public schools which traditionally have been con-
sidered to stand for the antithesis of separatist sectarian instruction. 68
In fact, both pre- and post-Act equal access has caused divisiveness in
265. Section 4071(d)(3) specifically declares that the state is not authorized by the Act to
"expend public funds beyond the incidental cost of providing space" for meetings. However, it
does not expressly bar expenditures for teachers' salaries.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 245-52.
267. "[Government aid] will destroy that moderation and harmony which the forebearance
of our laws to intermeddle with religion has produced among its several sects." J. Madison, A
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, para. 11 (1784), reprinted in W.
HUTCHISON, R. RUTLAND, & W. RACHAL, PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 295-306 (1962). See
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622, 624. Although the divisiveness factor in the entanglement inquiry in
Lemon recently appears to have been limited by the Court to cases involving direct financial
support by government to religious institutions, see Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1364-65, and Mueller,
463 U.S. at 403 n. 11, see, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985), it remains to be seen
how this new divisiveness test will be applied to equal access meetings in public schools. Sev-
eral courts have found divisiveness to result from equal access meetings. Bell v. Little Axe
Indep. School Dist., 766 F.2d 1391, 1406-07 (10th Cir. 1985); Trietley v. Board of Educ., 65
A.D.2d 1, 7, 409 N.Y.S.2d 912, 917 (1978); Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School
Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 14, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43, 50 (1977).
Aside from the entanglement test, eschewal of strife and division among religions is con-
sidered to be among the major policy reasons for the separation of church/state mandate. See
Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399-400 ("what is at stake as a matter of policy.., is preventing that kind
and degree of government involvement in religious life that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead
to strife and frequently strain a political system to the breaking point") (citing Nyquist, 413
U.S. at 796). This is especially important in the public schools. McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (students "will thus have inculcated in
them a feeling of separation when the school should be the training ground for habits of com-
munity .... ").
268. See Abington, 374 U.S. at 242 (Brennan, J., concurring); McCollum, 333 U.S. at 231
("[i]n no activity of the State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces than in its schools, to
avoid confusing, not to say fusing, what the Constitution sought to keep strictly apart")
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). But see Brief For the United State as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 15, Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., No. 84-773 (U.S. S. Ct.) (a policy
of equal access for all groups is precisely the ideal envisioned by the Founders).
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communities, z69 which was attested to by the schools both in the legisla-
tive process and later as applied. 7°
Manifestly, equal access poses numerous entanglement problems.
Denying equal access to religious clubs also raises entanglement
problems, as the Court found in Widmar.27'1 Nevertheless, in the high
school, as opposed to the university, given the foregoing entanglement
problems, lesser ongoing entanglement is involved when equal access
religious clubs are disallowed.a 2 Moreover, the minimal entanglement
that results when a school official distinguishes between the religious and
the nonreligious would appear to be an entanglement contemplated by
the Court's school religion decisions.2 73
269. See, e.g., Little Axe, 766 F.2d at 1406-07 ("The question of whether the school board
would permit the meetings to continue fomented political divisiveness .... [T]his only further
embroiled local government in an issue that had already divided a community along religious
lines."); see infra note 270; Young Life Youth Ministries Activities Raise Policy Issue for Educa-
tors, EDUC. WEEK, Oct. 28, 1983, at 1, 14 (concerning Inoka High School in Minneapolis-
divisiveness resulting from entry of youth ministry into the schools). Recently school board
meetings considering implementation of the Equal Access Act have turned into divisive com-
munity debates. See, e.g., Saddleback Trustees Refuse Policy Change on Religious Meetings,
L.A. Times, Jan. 23, 1985, at 1; Religion-at-School Issue Embroils Local Districts, The Regis-
ter, Jan. 20, 1985, at Religion A1-2 (concerning rejection of Equal Access Act in Saddleback
Valley Unified School District); Christians Seek Classroom Use, The Denver Post, Dec. 7,
1984, at 1-A, 17A (considering rejection of Equal Access Act implementation in Boulder High
School, Boulder, Colo.).
270. The former superintendent of the Little Axe, Oklahoma school district, testified that
the prayer sessions produced "sensitiveness," "disharmony," and "disruptiveness" in the little
community. (Record at 187, Little Axe). This behavior resulted in the plaintiffs having to
remove students from the Little Axe school district. (Record at 684, Little Axe). See Little
Axe, No. CIV-81-620-T, slip op. at 16 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 11, 1983) ("The angry divisions
among citizens of the school district and the hostile, boorish behavior generated by this emo-
tional controversy very clearly establishes the divisiveness along religious lines in the commu-
nity."). See also Religious Speech Protection Act Hearings, supra note 11, at 43 (statement of
Linda Tarr-Whelan, Dir. of Gov't Rel., NEA). Post-Equal Access Act schools have attested
to the problems engendered by the decision whether to implement the Act. One school even
turned to litigation to avoid the strife between religious factions. See Commack v. Rossi, No.
CIV-85-1288 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
271. See, e.g., Widmar, 454 U.S. at 272 n.11 (barring religious meetings on the university
campus would exacerbate the entanglement because the university would have to determine
"which words and activities fall within 'religious worship' "). See Bender, 741 F.2d at 568
(Adams, J., dissenting).
272. Bender, 741 F.2d at 556 (distinguishing Widmar, 454 U.S. at 272 n. 11 and citing
Mueller, 463 U.S. at 403, as recent example of the Court holding entanglement test not vio-
lated when state officials are required to distinguish between secular and religious textbooks).
273. See Abington, 374 U.S. 203, 278-79, 300 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Bender,
741 F.2d at 556 (citing Engel, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)). See also Mueller, 463 U.S. at 388 (uphold-
ing the principle of distinguishing between secular and religious texts).
IH. The Unitary Forum Analysis
A. Introduction
The Establishment Clause, as a constitutional mandate of content
discrimination against government-sponsored religious speech,274 clearly
conflicts with equal access theory which treats religious and nonreligious
speech in the same way. Nevertheless, equal access proponents claim that
the establishment problems raised by religious activities in public high
schools are outweighed by free speech and equal protection rights. These
countervailing constitutional rights assertedly flow from a characteriza-
tion of public schools as "open forums." '75 Proponents claim that this
"open forum" characterization overcomes the establishment problems by
providing equal access to public facilities to all school clubs, religious
and nonreligious, so that no special benefit accrues to religious clubs.2 76
This argument, however, conflicts with the Establishment Clause.
Characterizing public schools as open forums places schools on the
same footing as public parks in which equal access is a mandatory free
274. As declared by the Court in Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271 n.9:
[T]he Establishment Clause requires the State to distinguish between "religious"
speech-speech, undertaken or approved by the State, the primary effect of which is
to support an establishment of religion-and "nonreligious" speech-speech, under-
taken or approved by the State, the primary effect of which is not to support an
establishment of religion. This distinction is required by the plain text of the Consti-
tution. It is followed in our cases. E.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
275. The characterization of public schools as "open forums," see infra notes 297-332 and
accompanying text, triggers free speech rights, see Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981),
and equal protection rights barring content discrimination, see Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp.
963 (M.D. Miss. 1969). The "open forum" doctrine-the basis of the Widmar Court's uphold-
ing of the right of a religious group to have access to public facilities in the university-essen-
tially requires that there be no content discrimination against speech in the public forum. See
Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). See generally Note, The Rights of
Student Religious Groups Under the First Amendment to Hold Religious Meetings on the Public
University Campus, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 1008, 1050-51 (1981). Equal access proponents seek
to extend Widmar, claiming that open forum principles barring content-based discrimination
against religious speech in universities apply equally to high schools and compel allowance of
religious activities there. See, e.g., Bender, 563 F. Supp. at 704 (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. at
270).
In framing the issue as one of "free speech," equal access proponents recast the issue of
prayer in schools. No longer is the question whether establishment principles forbid state-
assisted, student-initiated prayers, but rather whether free speech principles compel their ac-
commodation. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 284 (White, J., dissenting). Compare Stein v. Oshin-
sky, 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1965) (free speech does not compel schools to allow religious
activity) with Bender, 741 F.2d at 538 (free speech rights to equal access are overridden by
establishment concerns which compel barring religious club).
276. E.g., Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269-70, (cited in Bender, 741 F.2d at 562-63 (Adams, J.,
dissenting)).
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speech right. 7 Yet this open forum characterization overlooks the ex-
tensive government purpose and involvement in public schools. Open
forums must be free of the government purpose, control, and involve-
ment present in public schools. This government involvement prevents
any characterization of public high schools as open forums. It also cre-
ates the establishment problems inherent in equal access. Accordingly, a
single analysis of the government purpose, control, and involvement in
public high schools can respond to the establishment, free speech and
equal protection issues raised by equal access. This single factual in-
quiry-which underlies both the characterization of public high schools
as open forums and the resolution of the establishment issues raised by
equal access-constitutes the proposed "unitary forum analysis."2 8
The unitary forum analysis suggests that the establishment and free
speech concerns raised by religious activities on government property are
related. Both issues can be resolved by determining the government's
purpose and involvement in the forum.279 The government has different
expressive purposes and has varying levels of involvement with respect to
different kinds of public property, such as parks, streets, universities,
277. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 14-15,
Bender v. Williamsport, No. 84-773 (filed May 1985); Brief For Petitioners at 14, id.
278. The unitary forum analysis in this Article is applied only to cases of organized, group
religious speech on government property. The unitary forum analysis itself, however, is appli-
cable to any case in which an equal access justification is raised in an establishment challenge.
Applying the analysis in these other cases may raise issues not addressed in this Article. For
example, the challenged religious activity may be de minimis under the Establishment Clause,
as in the case of individual expressions of religious belief. See infra text accompanying note
323. Isolated personal actions may not implicate Establishment Clause concerns. Cf Wallace
v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2491 (1985).
It may appear that the unitary forum analysis is deficient in some cases involving "lim-
ited" public forums, see Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), in which accepted doctrine
requires consideration of the incompatibility of the manner in which the speech is expressed
with the normal activities occurring in the forum at that time. Id. at 116. The unitary forum
analysis does not examine the manner of expression of religious speech, nor does it employ an
incompatibility analysis. This, however, results from the scope of the unitary forum analysis,
that is, cases involving religious speech that raise establishment concerns. Because the Estab-
lishment Clause requires content discrimination against religious speech, see supra note 274,
the unitary forum analysis excludes consideration of the manner in which religious speech is
expressed. By contrast, the Grayned incompatibility analysis applies strict scrutiny to pro-
tected political speech. 408 U.S. at 116.
279. Moreover, the validity of free exercise claims to group worship in schools also turns in
large part on the extent of government control over the forum. Because the public schools are
considered to be under less control by government supervision than, for example, prisons or
military bases, free exercise rights to communal prayer in the public schools have not been
recognized by the Supreme Court. Students have constitutionally adequate alternative forums
in which to exercise their religious beliefs. See, e.g., Abington, 374 U.S. at 250-53 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). See also Wood v. Mount Lebanon Township, 342 F. Supp. 1293, 1295 (W.D. Pa.
1972). See also infra text accompanying notes 523-530.
schools, and prisons. Under the unitary forum analysis, different first
amendment establishment and free speech mandates arise with respect to
different government forums. Applied to public high schools, the unitary
forum analysis reveals that a coherent first amendment consideration of
equal access necessitates two coincident, inversely related findings: (1)
equal access violates the Establishment Clause and (2) high schools are
not open forums.
Prevailing first amendment theory holds that the first amendment
dilemma posed by competing establishment and free speech interests
must be resolved by a balancing test to determine the "weightier" inter-
est.280 By contrast, the unitary forum analysis suggests that in almost all
instances the characterization of the forum in which the conflict arises
permits inversely correlated establishment and free speech findings, thus
obviating the need for a balancing test. In practice, however, there are a
few instances in which the unitary forum analysis yields two conflicting
characterizations of the forum-which results in competing first amend-
ment interests. In these cases, clashes between establishment and free
speech concerns should be reconciled through a search for alternative
forums for free religious expression.
B. Application
The Supreme Court has held that equal access is required in public
forums, regardless of the Establishment Clause.2 ' Accordingly, the
characterization of public school forums is central to equal access analy-
sis. The unitary forum analysis examines the purpose of the public prop-
erty and the extent of government involvement therein. In traditional
public forums, there is a strong government purpose of encouraging ex-
pression. To facilitate free speech and association, there is a low level of
government control and involvement. This purpose, and low level of
280. See, e.g., Note, Religious Expression in the Public School Forum: The High School
Student's Right to Free Speech, 72 GEo. L.J. 135, 136-37, 149 (1983). Based on Widmar, equal
access proponents claim that there is a "compelling interest" test, whereby in a public forum
there must be equality of access for nonreligious and religious speech alike. See Widmar, 454
U.S. at 270. See, e.g., Bender, 741 F.2d at 557. This right is defeated only when exclusion is
necessary to serve a "compelling state interest." Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270. Under this theory,
the establishment problems posed by equal access clubs are "not compelling." See, e.g.,
Bender, 741 F.2d at 561-69 (Adams, J., dissenting). Thus, according to equal access propo-
nents, the First Amendment balance is struck in favor of free speech. Widmar, 454 U.S. at
276.
281. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951);
Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948). See also O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir.
1979).
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government involvement, raise a presumption in favor of free speech
rights and against a finding of establishment.
Accordingly, in the many cases defining public forum rights for reli-
gious expression, the focus is on where "the speaking which is regulated
take[s] place. '2 82 In the traditional public forum, whether park or street,
there is a free expression "right to be" and "to impart [one's] views to
others. '28 3 Once a forum is characterized as "public," the First Amend-
ment requires equal access to religious groups for expressive purposes,
and no impermissible establishment results.
A similar unitary analysis was recently used in Scarsdale v. Mc-
Creary284 which concerned an establishment challenge to an unattended
nativity scene displayed in a small park in a traffic circle. The Second
Circuit made a unitary finding on the nature of the forum, permitting it
to find both a public forum right of access and no establishment of reli-
gion. The court's free speech analysis began by noting that the govern-
ment's purpose in the park was expressive and that private citizens
exercised control over the park. Crucial to this finding was the court's
determination that the park was available to a broad range of expres-
sion. 285 This evidentiary factor-the broad array of expression available
in the park-caused the court, relying on Widmar, to find that the nativ-
ity scene only incidentally benefitted religion, so that there was no
establishment.2 86
Government property that is not a traditional public forum, such as
a public university, also may be characterized as a public forum under
the unitary forum analysis. The characterization of such property as a
public forum turns on the intended function and use of the property.287
This requires an examination of (1) whether there is a government pur-
pose in free expression and (2) the extent of government control and in-
volvement in the forum. Just as in the traditional public forum, this
inquiry produces inversely correlated establishment and free expression
concerns regarding equal access.
In Widmar, the Court's analysis commenced with a factual inquiry
282. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. at 282 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
283. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940).
284. 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985), aff'gper curiam, McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir.
1984).
285. McCreary, 739 F.2d at 722. Unlike the Widmar Court, which examined the actual
preexisting array of clubs as evidence of a public forum, 454 U.S. at 267-68, the McCreary
Court was satisfied with the mere hypothetical availability of the forum to a broad range of
religious and nonreligious groups and individuals. McCreary, 739 F.2d at 727.
286. 739 F.2d at 727.
287. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983).
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concerning the nature of the public university forum.188 This factual
analysis, which included consideration of the broad array of inquiry pos-
sible on a university campus, gave rise to related establishment and free
speech considerations. First, the broad spectrum of ideas in the univer-
sity forum was an indication of the university's communicative purpose
as a "generally open forum" or a "marketplace of ideas." '289 Second, this
communicative purpose weighed against finding an establishment: by al-
lowing equal access to all ideas, any benefit to religion was "inciden-
tal."2 90  The inverse but interdependent relationship of the two
constitutional concerns permitted the Court in Widmar to eschew em-
ploying a balancing test.
The results of the unitary analysis in Widmar rely on a characteriza-
tion of the university as a public forum. However, a similar characteriza-
tion of public high schools has in almost all cases been rejected by the
courts.291 In the one case where it was accepted, Bender v. Williamsport
Area School District,292 the district court's approach still followed the
unitary analysis. The court's determinations concerning the first amend-
ment concerns raised by equal access in the high school were interdepen-
dent: the court made a positive public forum determination,
necessitating a negative establishment finding.293 Following Widmar, the
court in Bender noted that in Williamsport High School there is a "broad
• . . spectrum of student groups. '294 This "spectrum" simultaneously
created a "limited public forum, ' 29 5 which evidenced a "secular effect,"
rather than religious establishment.296
Notwithstanding the district court's opinion in Bender, public
schools are not open public forums. The government's educative purpose
in public high schools, and the extensive government control and in-
volvement required to implement this goal, at once pose establishment
problems and preclude a public forum characterization.297
288. 454 U.S. at 267-70.
289. 454 U.S. at 267 & n.5 (citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972)). See infra text
accompanying notes 306-309.
290. Id. at 273-74 (citing Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973)).
291. See infra note 297.
292. 563 F. Supp. 697, rev'd on other grounds, 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984).
293. 563 F. Supp. 707-08.
294. Id. at 711 (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274).
295. 563 F. Supp. at 706.
296. Id. at 711.
297. See, e.g., Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1048; Brandon, 635 F.2d at 980; Hunt v. Board of
Educ., 321 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (S.D. W. Va. 1971); Trietley v. Board of Educ., 65 A.D.2d 1, 4,
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The public forum inquiry is a factual one.2 98 Courts have uniformly
rejected the proposition that public property necessarily constitutes a
public forum.29 9 The Supreme Court has held that government has the
power to preserve property under its ownership and control for lawful
purposes other than expression." Accordingly, to determine whether a
public forum has been created, one must assess the nature of the property
at issue.3"' As the Court held most recently in Perry Education Associa-
tion v. Perry Educators'Association,30 2 it is necessary to examine the pur-
pose and use to which the public property has been dedicated.
The presumptive purpose of the public schools is education, not
equal access communication.30 3 Public schools may be compared with
government buildings with specific government purposes other than free
409 N.Y.S.2d 912, 915 (1978). Cf Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 44-47 (1983); Ellis v. Dixon, 349 U.S. 458 (1955).
In certain circumstances courts have held the public schools to be limited free speech
forums. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (distinguishable from equal
access cases because speech at issue did not involve government). See also Little Axe, 766 F.2d
at 1401; Bender, 741 F.2d at 548; International Center for Krishna Consciousness v. New
Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth., 691 F.2d 155, 160 (3d Cir. 1982) (dictum considering public
school to be limited public forum). For case law concerning the establishment holding, see
supra note 38.
298. E.g., Bender, 741 F.2d at 541-42.
299. United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114, 129
(1981); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 405 (1953); Bell v. Little Axe Indep. School
Dist., 766 F.2d 1391, 1401; Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999, 1001 (2d Cir. 1965); Hunt v.
Board of Educ., 321 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (S.D. W. Va. 1971) (quoting Poulos v. New Hamp-
shire, 345 U.S. 395, 405) ("The principles of the First Amendment are not to be treated as a
promise that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may gather around him at any public
place and at any time for a group discussion or instruction"). See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S.
828 (1976).
300. United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114, 129
(1981); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999, 1001 (2d Cir.
1965).
301. See, e.g., Bender, 563 F. Supp. at 705 ("The forum is limited by the nature and pur-
pose of the university's action."); McCreary, 575 F. Supp. at 1122 ("[i]n assessing whether a
free speech right of access to public property has been impermissibly denied, the court must
make an initial determination as to the nature of the property involved." (footnote omitted)).
302. 460 U.S. 37, 46-49; see also International Center for Krishna Consciousness v. New
Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth., 691 F.2d 155, 160 (3d Cir. 1982) ("primary factor in deter-
mining whether property owned or controlled by the government is a public forum is how the
locale is used").
303. See Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 869
(1982); Ambach Comm'r of Educ. v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979) (purpose of public
high school is not marketplace of ideas but rather "preparation of individuals for participation
as citizens"); Ellis v. Dixon, 349 U.S. 458 (1955); Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1048; Brandon, 635
F.2d at 980; Stein, 348 F.2d at 1001, 1002; Hunt, 321 F. Supp. at 1266; Trietley, 65 A.D.2d at
4, 6, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 915, 917. See also Abington, 374 U.S. at 230 (Brennan, J., concurring)
("Americans regard the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a
democratic system of government"); McCollum, 333 U.S. at 231 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
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expression, such as courthouses,3" and distinguished from traditional
public forums, such as parks and streets, which are designated for free
expression.0o
The nature of public high schools may also be contrasted with that
of public universities. The university has been characterized as a "mar-
ketplace of ideas, °3 0 6 dedicated by the state in part for use as a public
forum.0 7 By contrast, the courts have determined the government pur-
pose in public high schools to be educative. This determination relies on
a variety of indicia, chief among which is the limited range of inquiry
characteristic of public high schools. This limited inquiry distinguishes
high schools from open forums such as public parks and universities.
Comparing the secondary school function with the broad goals of higher
education, the Third Circuit in Bender noted:
The educational mission of a high school, in contrast, is more
circumscribed. The curriculum consists less of, and indeed is less
conducive to an unfettered inquiry....
[I]t is unlikely that school authorities would seek to create a
truly open forum in a high school environment for unregulated di-
("The public school is at once the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means for
promoting our common destiny.").
304. As the Second Circuit stated in Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d at 1001:
Neither the Free Exercise Clause nor the Free Speech Clause requires a state to per-
mit persons to engage in public prayer in state-owned facilities wherever and when-
ever they desire. Poulos v. State of New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 405 (1953). It
would scarcely be argued that a court had to suffer a trial or an argument to be
interrupted any time that spectators-or even witnesses or jurymen-desired to in-
dulge in collective oral prayer.
305. See Perry Educ. Ass'n., 460 U.S. at 45-46; Trietley, 65 A.D.2d 1, 6, 309 N.Y.S.2d 912,
917. Parks and streets "have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and,
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions," Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (cited in
Perry Edur- Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45.) Characteristic of parks and streets is a diversity of uses,
religious and nonreligious, which diffuse any semblance of government sponsorship of religion.
Thus, all forms of expression have been upheld. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951)
(upholding Bible talks with permits in parks); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (permit-
ting religious lectures through loudspeakers in parks); Murdoch v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105
(1943) (upholding distribution of religious literature as a noncommercial religious enterprise);
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (upholding right of religious group to hold street
parade); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (upholding distribution of religious
literature). See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981)
(upholding religious solicitation in public fair); O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (upholding papal Mass in national mall).
306. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (presumption of university as marketplace of
ideas places burden on college to deny right of expression). See also Note, supra note 275, at
1052; Brooks v. Auburn Univ., 412 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1969); Gay Rights Student Org. v.
Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (Ist Cir. 1974).
307. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267.
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alogue and inquiry.30 8
The Supreme Court has found that such limited inquiry is characteristic
of nonpublic forums.30 9
Because public high schools are forums of limited inquiry, the con-
tent discrimination necessary to the development of the school curricu-
lum has been held to be constitutional.310 High schools may exercise
content discrimination in their choice of curriculum and clubs to further
educative goals.311 A fortiori, content discrimination to avoid establish-
ment challenges may be sustained.3 12 Only the drawing of distinctions
among religious clubs would raise constitutional concerns.313
Aside from its independent significance, the educative purpose of
public high schools creates the necessity for extensive government con-
trol and involvement to further this goal. The extent of government con-
trol and involvement in public high schools has been discussed in the
context of school sponsorship of religious clubs.314 The chief factors evi-
dencing government control, in addition to curriculum-related content
restrictions, are the use of compulsory attendance laws to bring students
to the school and the use of teacher monitors to supervise students dur-
ing the day to ensure attendance, order and student well-being.315
308. 741 F.2d at 548.
309. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 406 U.S. at 47 ("selective access does not transform government
property into a public forum").
310. See, e.g., Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214 (3rd Cir. 1981). Cf Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460
U.S. at 55 ("on government property that has not been made a public forum, not all speech is
equally situated, and the State may draw distinctions which relate to the special purpose for
which the property is used").
311. See, e.g., Little.Axe, 766 F.2d at 1402. See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 55; Seyfried
v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1981) (no First Amendment right for students to use school
facilities to present play of their choice).
312. Courts have sustained content discrimination to avoid establishment problems. See,
e.g., Lubbock 669 F.2d at 1048; Brandon, 635 F.2d at 980; Trietley, 65 A.D.2d at 8, 409
N.Y.S.2d at 917. This has been true even in one university forum case. See Dittman v. West-
ern Wash. Univ., No. 79-1189 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 28, 1980) (state university limited use of
classrooms for religious purposes; court held that the university had interfered with free exer-
cise, but that compelling interest existed in not violating the Establishment Clause), vacated
and remanded in light of Widmar, No. 80-3120 (9th Cir. Mar. 30, 1982).
313. Equal protection concerns would result if distinctions were made among religions, as
opposed to between religion and nonreligion, in making access decisions. Brandon, 635 F.2d
at 980; Hunt, 321 F. Supp. at 1266; Trietley, 65 A.D.2d at 8, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 917. Cf Larson v.
Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 255 (1982) (striking Minnesota statute according tax exemptions to
religious organizations preferentially according to size). But see Stacy v. Williams, 306 F.
Supp. 963 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
314. See supra text accompanying notes 164-213.
315. Bender, 741 F.2d at 552-53. Compulsory attendance is required nationwide with al-
most no exceptions. E.g., Bell v. Little Axe Indep. School Dist., 766 F.2d 1391, 1406 (10th
Cir. 1985) (citing Oklahoma law requiring school attendance: OKLA. STAT. tit. § 105 (1981)).
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 226-29 (1972); McCollum, 333 U.S. at 209. Teacher
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These factors negate the possibility of characterizing public high
schools as public forums316 and undermine the premises- indispensable
in an open forum-that attendance and association in the forum are
voluntary.317
The importance of government control and involvement in the uni-
tary forum analysis is highlighted in cases in which these factors are
missing. When religious meetings are held off school premises,318 on
weekends or at night, so that neither compulsory school attendance nor
teacher supervision is in effect, there is a lesser establishment problem.319
monitoring on school premises during the school day is also required nationwide. See, e.g.,
Little Axe, 766 F.2d at 1406 (citing Oklahoma law requiring such supervision: OKLA. STAT.
tit. 70 § 6-114 (1981)); Brandon, 635 F.2d at 979 (noting New York law requires schools to
provide student supervision).
316. Determination of what occurs in the public schools is largely controlled by school
authorities. See Ellis v. Dixon, 349 U.S. 458, 459-60 (1955); Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999,
1002 (2d Cir. 1965); Trietley v. Board of Educ., 65 A.D.2d 1, 5, 409 N.Y.S.2d 912, 915.
Because of this school structure, even those courts finding a public forum in the public school
have determined that at best the schools are "limited forums." See International Center for
Krishna Consciousness v. New Jersey Sports and Exposition Auth., 691 F.2d 155, 160 (3d Cir.
1982). See also Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969).
317. See Bender, 741 F.2d at 552 ("Within this more restricted environment, therefore,
involuntary contact between nonparticipating students and religious groups is inevitable."); id.
(distinguishing Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274 ("high school instruction is given in a structured and
controlled environment and in more confined facilities than is usual in the open, free, and more
fluid environment of a college campus")); see also Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976)
(authority of commanding officer to exclude civilians from area of command as factor against
public forum finding).
318. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
319. See, eg., Country Hills Christian Church v. Unified School Dist., 560 F. Supp. 1207
(D. Kan. 1983) (upholding "equal access policy," finding that access should not be denied to a
religious worship group when school facilities are used during nonschool hours and open to
nonschool community groups). See also Resnick v. East Brunswick Township, 135 N.J. Super.
257, 262-63, 343 A.2d 127, 130 (1975) (dictum affirming constitutionality of rentals of public
school facilities to religious bodies). Compare Wood v. Mount Lebanon Township, 342 F.
Supp. 1293, 1295 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (address by clergy to high school graduation held to occur
during noncompulsory school hours and therefore not in violation of the Establishment
Clause) with Bender, 741 F.2d 538, 552 (allowing religious clubs to meet during school day
implicates compulsory attendance and state supervision).
The importance of state sponsorship in determining establishment concerns has been
compared to the state action determination in equal protection analysis, although a lesser
showing of state involvement is required for the latter. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S.
455, 469-70 (1973). Compare Country Hills Christian Church v. Unified School Dist., 560 F.
Supp. 1207 (D. Kan. 1983) (upholding the religious use of the schools on weekends with no
state sponsorship) with Knights of the KKK v. East Baton Rouge, 578 F.2d 1122, 1128 (5th
Cir. 1978) (upholding KKK use of school facilities open to the public after hours) ("[T]here is
simply no state involvement here in KKK's ideas or practices, whatever they may be, and no
state action endorsing them"); National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d
1010, 1014 (4th Cir. 1973) (upholding use by Party of high school auditorium during "non-
school hours" for "non-school use") (emphasis in the original); Lawrence Univ. Bicentennial
Comm'n v. City of Appleton, 409 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (holding unconstitutional
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The distinction between the extent of state involvement implicated when
schools are functioning as schools, rather than as buildings for rental use
during nights or weekends, is well recognized in constitutional theory.
320
Similarly, absolutely private or individual activities, such as those in-
volved in Tinker v. Des Moines, 321 and West Virginia v. Barnette,322 do
not implicate a level of government involvement sufficient to create estab-
lishment concerns.323
The mere labeling of a school as a "limited public forum," as pro-
vided for in section 4071(a) of the Equal Access Act, does not make it so.
However, the question remains whether there are any circumstances
under which a "limited public forum ' 324 could be created in the public
schools that would reverse the presumption of government establishment
when religious clubs are involved.
When public school premises are used during the school day, the
government educative purpose is preeminent. This purpose has two ef-
fects: It requires selective access to the school educational program in
contravention of public forum principles; and all activities that occur
with school involvement and within the school day are defined as occur-
ring in furtherance of this government educative purpose. Thus, formi-
dable establishment problems result when organized religious activities
are permitted during the school day.
Both the free speech and establishment consequences of the govern-
ment educative purpose are reversed when the public school property is
rededicated from the government educative purpose to the purpose of
individual communication. For instance, an equal access policy at a time
school board guidelines barring religious or political activities, unless nonpartisan or nonde-
nominational, applicable to the rental of a college gym on evenings for use by the community.
320. As Professor Tribe has noted:
A distinction might be drawn where the school buildings are not otherwise in use, as
at night or during a vacation period, when the building is, in a sense, surplus land. A
religious activity conducted on the premises at such a time may not be viewed as part
of the educational enterprise of all.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 825 n.12 (1978).
321. 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (sustaining symbolic student armband display).
322. 319 U.S. 637 (1943) (sustaining student right not to recite pledge of allegiance or to
salute the flag).
323. Moreover, retention of personal free speech rights does not convert a school to a pub-
lic forum. See Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1048; Brandon, 635 F.2d at 980. Cf Tinker v. Des
Moines, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
324. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 n.5. "Limited public forum" qualifies the nature of the
forum to include only those persons who have a "right" to be at the forum. See Perry Educ.
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). The Equal Access Act considers the forum rights under the statute
to extend only to students and not to outsiders. A claim by teachers to equal access under the
Act is currently in the courts. Mary May v. Evansville-Vanderburgh, 615 F. Supp. 761 (S.D.
Ind. 1985).
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that does not conflict with the government educative purpose, such as
evening and weekend use of the public school premises, may create a
valid public forum.3 2 5 However, even in these circumstances, establish-
ment problems may be avoided only if the school is in no way involved in
the religious meetings. Thus the school may not recognize or sanction the
clubs nor assign the classrooms; teachers may not supervise the clubs;
and no school medium may be used to announce the evening clubs.3 26
Costs to cover club expenditures should be paid from student fees. 32 7 A
reasonable rent should be charged to all groups for the use of the
classrooms. 328
Notwithstanding all of these limitations on government involve-
ment, establishment problems may result when the religious club is the
only club, or one of the only clubs which meets on government property.
This would suggest, as an evidentiary matter, that the purpose of the
equal access policy was religious rather than expressive.329
This analysis demonstrates that although the establishment and free
speech determinations are interdependent, the nature of the forum alters
the relevant presumption.330 Thus, because of the government purpose,
control, and involvement in the public schools, the government carries
the burden to disprove an establishment violation when a religious activ-
ity is organized on school premises.331 In contrast, where government
exercises less control and involvement, in parks and universities for in-
stance, the presumption is in favor of free speech principles, with the
325. See, e.g., Country Hills Christian Church v. Unified School Dist., 560 F. Supp. 1207
(D. Kan. 1983); Resnick v. East Brunswick Township Bd. of Educ., 77 N.J. 88, 389 A.2d 944
(1978) (use of school facilities by religious groups on Sundays for religious worship and in-
struction); Pratt v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 110 Ariz. 466, 520 P.2d 514 (1974) (en banc)
(upholding rental of Arizona State University Stadium by evangelical organization). See also
Bell v. Little Axe, 766 F.2d at 1406 (holding that religious services cannot be held during times
the school grounds are used for school purposes and that they should occur instead when
school facility is available by state law to any group).
326. See infra note 327.
327. See Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 84-031 (1984). See also Widmar, 454 U.S. 263 (student fees
paid for all equal access costs beyond cost of classrooms); Note, supra note 90, 50 U. CIN. L.
REV. 741, 781-83.
328. See, e.g., supra note 325.
329. See, e.g., Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274-75. More than 100 clubs used the university equal
access policy. Whether the availability of access rather than actual range of access suffices is
unclear. See McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716, 727 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding park to be a public
forum because of availability for range of displays, notwithstanding that the only recurring use
was for a religious display), aff'd per curiam, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985).
330. The presumptions reflect "judicial interpretation of social facts." Lynch v. Donnelly,
104 S. Ct. 1355, 1369 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
331. See, eg., Brandon, 635 F.2d 971.
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burden on the plaintiff seeking to show an establishment problem.332
IV. The Free Exercise Arguments For Equal Access
While equal access theory is grounded on public forum, free speech,
and equal protection principles, some of its proponents find further sup-
port for equal access in the Free Exercise Clause.333 This position regards
student organization of religious clubs not only as a free speech right, but
also as an exercise of freedom of religion, and thus doubly protected
under the First Amendment. 334 A school's refusal to allow access to a
student prayer club purportedly violates student free exercise rights.335
The asserted free exercise rights are rights to engage in communal
prayer,336 Bible reading, and discussion.
It is difficult to characterize rights to equal access and group prayer
in the schools as free exercise rights. Ordinarily, communal prayer is not
central to a student's religious beliefs, a requirement necessary to achieve
free exercise right status.337 Accordingly, in addition to raising free exer-
cise claims to "group worship," the equal access right has been charac-
terized as including a free exercise right to proselytize to uncommitted
students.338 This free exercise right to proselytize is sectarian-only a
332. See, e.g., Widmar, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953);
McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984).
333. Proponents of this argument are relatively few. See, e.g., Religious Speech Protection
Act Hearings, supra note 11, at 46 (statement of Prof. Laurence Tribe, Harvard Law School);
see also S. REP. No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2348, 2370.
334. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . .
335. See, e.g., Brandon, 635 F.2d at 975.
336. Id.
337. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 627 (1978); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
216 (1972).
338. See, e.g., Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. Mo. 1979), remanded, 635 F.2d
1310 (8th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). Students as-
serted part of the purpose of the meeting was to encourage and challenge the undecided and
the uncommitted so that students make "a personal decision in favor of trusting in Jesus
Christ.... Our purpose as a group is to promote a knowledge and awareness of Jesus Christ
on the campus . I..." d  at 911. See also Note, supra note 275, at 1047.
Whether assertion of an equal access free exercise right to proselytizing would be any
weightier than other equal access free exercise claims remains to be seen. The Supreme Court
in Widmar noted only the establishment aspects of such proselytizing. It did not address the
free exercise claims. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269-70 n.6.
In addition to the claimed right of students to group worship, another potential free exer-
cise claim, which has yet to be asserted in equal access cases, is a right of access to the schools
by outsiders for proselytizing purposes. See supra text accompanying notes 129-130.
Although a free exercise right to proselytizing is longstanding, see, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435
U.S. 618, 626 (1978) (free exercise "encompasses the right to preach, proselyte [sic] and per-
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few religions consider proselytizing to be a central tenet.339 None of these
free exercise arguments has gained acceptance. In considering student-
initiated clubs in schools, both state and federal courts have consistently
found that free exercise does not compel a right to equal access. 4°
The long-standing determination that there is no free exercise right
to organized group worship in the public schools dates from the Court's
1960's school prayer cases. Neither Abington School District v. Schempp
nor Engel v. Vitale, which respectively barred Bible study and organized
religious worship from the schools, recognize any free exercise rights that
might prevail against the establishment violation caused by these reli-
gious activities.34' The presence of alternative facilities to the schools for
religious activities is dispositive.342
The bar on group religious activity in the schools does not present a
coercive government obstacle to a religious practice necessary to estab-
lish a free exercise claim.343 To succeed, a free exercise claim requires
form other similar religious functions"); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free
exercise includes freedom to solicit on public street), it has been sustained only in traditional
public forums, id., and otherwise limited where other state interests so require, e.g., Heffron v.
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (limiting right to solicit in
state fairgrounds to a booth in interest of crowd control). In light of the nonpublic forum
nature of schools and the existence of many other alternatives for outsider proselytizing pur-
poses, see Cantwell, 310 U.S. 296, the proselytizing free exercise claim is of little merit.
339. See Note, supra note 275, at 1047 (evangelical Christians, who have as a central tenet
to their religion the mission to proselytize, are the sect most adversely affected by denials of
equal access).
340. See, eg., Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d
1038, 1048 (5th Cir. 1982); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 976 (2d Cir. 1980);
Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 563 F. Supp. 697, 701, rev'd on other grounds, 741
F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984); Hunt v. Board of Educ., 321 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (S.D. W. Va. 1971);
Trietley v. Board of Educ., 65 A.D.2d 1, 6, 40 N.Y.S.2d 912, 917 (App. Div. 1978); Johnson v.
Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1977). See
also Abington, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding no free exercise right for students to Bible reading
in school); Collins v. Chandler Unified School Dist., 644 F.2d 759, 763 (9th Cir. 1981); Stein v.
Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999, 1001-02 (2d Cir. 1965). Contra Dittman v. Western Wash. Univ., No.
79-1189 slip op. (W.D. Wash. Feb. 28, 1980) (public university), vacated and remanded in light
of Widmar, No. 80-3120 (9th Cir. Mar. 30, 1982); Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 48 (W.D.
Mich. 1965); Keegan v. University of Del., 349 A.2d 14 (Del. 1975). Indeed, at least one court
has gone so far as to find that the free exercise rights of students who are not equal access club
members would be threatened should the clubs be permitted. See Johnson v. Huntington
Beach Union High School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 7, 14; 137 Cal. Rptr. 43, 50 (1977).
341. See Abington, 374 U.S. 203; Engel, 370 U.S. 421.
342. "The student's compelled presence in school for five days a week in no way renders
the regular religious facilities of the community less accessible to him than they are to others."
Abington, 374 U.S. at 299 (Brennan, J., concurring).
343. The question of the extent of alternatives goes to the essence of the free exercise test.
To determine whether there is a violation of the Free Exercise Clause, one must determine the
importance of a particular religious practice and the extent to which exercise of that practice
has been burdened by the government action. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
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that the combination of government action and the absence of alterna-
tives effectively foreclose the practice of one's religion. 3"
The absence of free exercise rights to the use of the public school
forum stems from the many alternatives available to students. 345 These
alternatives include the use of the school premises when they are not
used as a school, and the use of other facilities during school hours or at
any other time.3 6 Given the many alternative forums, barring religious
clubs from the schools does not diminish the potential for religious
worship.
In this regard, the public high schools may be distinguished from
universities, where students both study and reside, ostensibly without al-
ternative sites for worship.347 Yet, even when the United States Supreme
Court had the opportunity to find a free exercise right to organized stu-
(1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). When no alternatives exist to a particular
practice and that practice is burdened by government action, there is sufficient coercion to
constitute a free exercise violation. As declared in Abington, "It is necessary in a free exercise
case for one to show the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against him in the
practice of his religion." 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
344. At issue is whether the school's failure to provide access to its facilities for religion
clubs would "effectively foreclose a person's practice of religion." Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1048.
Refusal to allow prayer clubs to meet does not "force them to forego their religious belief in
group worship." Bender, 563 F. Supp. at 703. See also Abington, 374 U.S. at 223. Instances in
which a government practice was found to foreclose the exercise of religion are rare. Thomas
v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717 (1981) (state's denial of unemployment compensation to
worker who quit employment for religious reasons violated free exercise right); cf. Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
345. See, e.g., Abington, 374 U.S. at 299 (Brennan, J., concurring); Lubbock, 669 F.2d at
1048; Bender, 563 F. Supp. at 703. Noting that alternatives were available, the court in Bran-
don declared: "While school attendance is compelled for several hours per day, five days per
week, the students, presumably living at home, are free to worship together as they please
before and after the school day and on weekends in a church or any other suitable place."
Brandon, 635 F.2d at 977. See also Resnick v. East Brunswick Township Bd. of Educ., 135
N.J. Super. 257, 263, 343 A.2d 127, 131 (1975). Cf McCreary v. Stone, 575 F. Supp. 1112,
1121 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (finding no free exercise right to private display of nativity scene in
public park, because there are alternative forums on private property), rev'd on other grounds,
739 F.2d 716, aff'd per curiam sub nom. Scarsdale v. McCreary, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985).
346. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (release time for religious study held
constitutional).
347. See, e.g., Abington, 374 U.S. at 299 (Brennan, J., concurring) (compulsory school at-
tendance does not render community facilities any less available). In Keegan v. University of
Del., 349 A.2d 14 (Del. 1975), the free exercise rights of university students to gather to pray
on campus were upheld. The Court emphasized that unlike high schools, the residential na-
ture of a university places students in the position of having to choose between praying at
school or not at all. 349 A.2d at 18 (discussing Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir.
1965)); Hunt v. Board of Educ., 321 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D. W. Va. 1971). See also Note, supra
note 275, at 1052. Compare Keegan, 349 A.2d at 18 with Widmar, 454 U.S. at 273 n.13 (not
inquiring into extent to which free exercise interests may be infringed by university policy
denying equal access to schools for religious groups).
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dent prayer clubs in a public university context, the Court did not do so.
Instead, it grounded its decision on the university students' free speech
rights.348
The reluctance to find a free exercise right to student-initiated reli-
gious clubs in the schools may be due in part to the desire to avoid a
confrontation between the religion clauses, which would require the bal-
ancing of competing free exercise and establishment interests.349 This
conffict is bypassed when courts elect not to find a free exercise interest in
organizing student-initiated clubs in the schools.3 50
The courts' refusal to recognize the free exercise interest as an im-
portant one has, by and large, circumvented the potential tension be-
tween free exercise and establishment interests that might be posed by
student prayer clubs.351 However, at least one court has determined that
even if an important free exercise interest exists, in the university forum,
the establishment interests are overriding. 352  In Dittman v. Western
Washington University,353 a district court prior to Widmar held free exer-
cise and establishment concerns were raised by the regular use of univer-
sity classrooms for religious worship. In balancing these concerns, the
348. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 273 n.13. ("we need not inquire into the extent, if
any, to which free exercise interests are infringed by the challenged University regulation")
(emphasis added). Notwithstanding the Court's failure to rule on the free exercise issue, equal
access proponents have claimed the contrary. See Religious Speech Protection Act Hearings,
supra note 11, at 45. Professor Tribe cited Widmar, 454 U.S. at 272 n.11, to support the
proposition that free exercise rights are violated where equal access is denied to religious clubs.
349. It has been suggested that the Supreme Court in Widmar characterized the right to
worship as freedom of speech in order to avoid a conflict between the religion clauses, even
though the question of free exercise was not argued in the lower court. See Note, Widinar v.
Vincent: The Use of a Freedom of Speech Analysis in the Context of Religion, 27 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 707, 715 (1983). This is a tension that, as the Court recognizes, results when free exer-
cise of religion cannot be promoted without offending establishment. See Committee for Pub.
Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
The Court has steadfastly gone out of its way to avoid this issue. See Pfeffer, Freedom and/or
Separation: The Constitutional Dilemma of the First Amendment, 64 MINN. L. REV. 561, 569,
583-84 (1980).
350. See supra note 340.
351. Compare supra note 5 with supra note 11 and note 340.
352. This despite commentators' suggestion that when the two clauses conflict, Free Exer-
cise must prevail. See Kurland, The Supreme Court, Compulsory Education and the First
Amendment's Religion Clauses, 75 W. VA. L. REV. 213, 244 (1973); Note, supra note 275, at
1024 n.126 (citing to L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 320, at 833-
34). See also McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 638 (1973) (Brennan, J., concurring); Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 240 (1972) (White, J., concurring); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 296 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Resnick v. East Brunswick Township Bd.
of Educ., 77 N.J. 88, 105, 389 A.2d 944, 952 (1978). But see Pfeffer, supra note 349, at 569,
583-84.
353. No. 79-1189, slip op. at 4-5 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 28, 1980), vacated and remanded in
light of Widmar, No. 80-3120 (9th Cir. Mar. 30, 1982).
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court held compliance with the Establishment Clause was a compelling
interest sufficient to justify the infringement of free exercise. 4 Crucial
to the court's decision was the recognition that restricting the free exer-
cise right at issue did not effect a total ban on worship and that alterna-
tives existed, such as meeting off campus.355
Conclusion
Notwithstanding the mandate of the Equal Access Act, permitting
student-initiated religious activities on public high school premises at
times associated with the school day raises substantial establishment
problems. When religious clubs are organized at times associated with
the school day, it is actually the state that gathers the students for reli-
gious purposes. The use of school premises and machinery to hold the
meetings provides state sanction to religion. Mandatory teacher supervi-
sion of religious groups aggravates the establishment problem. This state
sponsorship of religion in public schools has been barred by the Supreme
Court's interpretation of our first amendment principle of separation of
church and state.
State sponsorship is characteristic of the equal access programs that
have been challenged in the courts. Bender v. Williamsport Area School
District,356 currently on appeal before the United States Supreme Court,
typifies the constitutional difficulties of equal access. Beyond school
sanction of religious clubs, use of the school premises, and teacher super-
vision, Bender raises the added problem of scheduling organized religious
activities during the school day.
Many of these unconstitutional sponsorship factors are permitted by
the newly enacted Equal Access Act. The Act permits organization of
religious clubs under faculty supervision before and after the school day,
although it does not clearly address the issue of meetings held during the
school day. The Act's establishment problems are not abated by the re-
quirements of student-initiation and equal access for all clubs. These re-
354. Dittman, slip op. at 5-6.
355. Id. Cf. Committee of Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (disallowing direct
aid to nonpublic schools for maintenance and tuition tax deductions to parents of parochial
school children). The Court did not reach the balancing test because it found insufficient in-
fringement of free exercise, but dicta suggests that establishment would have prevailed, as in
Dittman. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 788-89. But cf Keegan v. University of Del., 349 A.2d 14 (Del.
1975), in which the court held that even when infringement on free exercise is only incidental,
the burden shifts to show a compelling interest to justify banning worship. Contrary to
Dittman, the court in Keegan found that the establishment clause problems that may arise
from the use of the university premises for prayer did not constitute a compelling interest to
justify banning the worship.
356. 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 518 (1985).
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finements do not diminish the extent of unconstitutional state
sponsorship under the Act, which is the essence of the prohibition of the
First Amendment Establishment Clause.
Moreover, the unconstitutional state sponsorship of religion is not
overridden by asserted countervailing first amendment free speech and
free exercise interests. In the context of the public high school forum, the
same factors that create establishment concerns undermine these claims.
Public high schools are dedicated to a specific pedagogical function and
require extensive government supervision. Accordingly, the free speech
and equal protection principles compelling equal treatment of religious
and nonreligious speech in the public forum do not arise in the public
high schools. In the absence of persuasive countervailing constitutional
interests, the establishment problems created by equal access and sanc-
tioned by the Equal Access Act require prohibition of equal access to
religious groups at times associated with the school day in our nation's
public high schools.

